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,LA RAZA LATINA?: MULTIRACIAL AMBIVALENCE,
COLOR DENIAL, AND THE EMERGENCE OF A TRIETHNIC JURISPRUDENCE AT THE END OF THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY
TOM I. ROMERO,

WI

PROLOGUE: HOW I RODE THE BUS INTO MICHIGAN
Imagine, if you will, my surprise when my grandmother and I were having a
conversation about my grandfather a few months after his death and she revealed to
me that she was not aware of my grandfather's indigenous roots.' Knowing that I
had a passion for history, she regaled me with stories about my grandfather's youth,
his perilous passage from Mexico into the United States, and my grandparents' hard
but satisfying lives building a farm and raising a family of five girls in southwestern
Colorado. Although she quietly and quickly spoke of the various acts of intolerance
and discrimination that she and my grandfather encountered as "Mexicans"2 who
knew only rudimentary English, my grandmother nevertheless took great pride in

* J.D., Ph.D. Associate Professor of Law, Hamline University School of Law. I want to thank Margaret
Montoya, Alicia Alvarez, Jonathan Kahn, Laurie Blumberg-Romero, Thomas Guglielmo, and the editors of the New
Mexico Law Review for reading various manifestations of this Article and, by their astute and penetrating
comments, improving my argument at every point. Thanks are also in order to the students in my Legal History
Seminar, Latinos and the Development of American Law, at Hamline University School of Law in Spring 2006,
who allowed me to test many of the ideas developed in this Article over the course of the semester. I also want to
acknowledge the outstanding work of Guadalupe Perez, Colleen Daly, Christina Lee, and Bethany Clark in
compiling much of the research for this Article. Finally, I want to acknowledge my family, particularly my maternal
grandmother Jennie Rodriguez, whose candidness and willingness to be part of this Article underscores the deep
and enduring love and affection that our families bring to our academic pursuits.
1. The stories recounted in this prologue are my recollection of oral exchanges between my maternal
grandmother, me, and other members of my immediate family during the course of my lifetime. In this vein, I am
indebted and profoundly shaped by the work of Critical Legal scholars who have documented the power of the
personal experiences of their grandparents and families to frame their legal analyses. See, e.g., Cheryl I. Harris,
Whiteness as Property, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1709 (1993); Michael A. Olivas, The Chronicles, My Grandfather's
Stories, and Immigration Law: The Slave Traders Chronicle as Racial History, 34 ST. Louis U. L.J. 425 (1990).
Despite a turn away from such narrative accounts in legal scholarship for what some critics describe as their
unreliability, such ambiguity should be regarded as "their strength: errors, inventions, and myths lead us through
and beyond facts to their meanings." ALESSANDRO PORTELLI, THE DEATH OF LUIGI TRASTULLI AND OTHER

STORIES: FORM AND MEANING INORAL HISTORY 2 (1991) (emphasis added). Because this Article is about how
concepts such as race, ethnicity, and color derive current and contested legal meanings, the stories in this prologue
are symbolic of the ways that one Spanish-surnamed family has come to understand and navigate the nation's color
fault lines. Moreover, oral tradition has long been a rich cultural resource for Latino communities, families, and
community groups. MARIO T. GARCIA, MEMORIES OF CHIcANo HISTORY: THE LIFE AND NARRATIVE OF BERT

CORONA 20-21 (1994). In "cuentos (stories), corridos (folk songs), chistes (jokes), dichos (proverbs), and
testimonios (testimonies)," oral tradition has served to sustain a distinct and often oppositional identity in a
multicultural and multiracial United States. Id. The testimonio, in particular, is a "cooperative process" because it
represents a form of "joint-authorship" and shared meaning between the scholar and those that he or she claims to
represent. See, e.g., id. at 1-26. Because I am choosing to represent one voice that is by no means my own in
framing the subsequent legal analysis, I take on the responsibility and dilemma of not wanting to reproduce the same
silences, hierarchies, and forms of ideological and cultural oppression that any study of social difference necessarily
implicates. See generally Joan Sangster, Telling Our Stories: Feminist Debates and the Use of Oral History, 3
WOMEN'S HIST. REv. 5 (1994).

2. The meanings ascribed to racial and ethnic terms are not subject to precise definitions but rather are
themselves constitutive of context, history, and questions of power. See infra Part I. I therefore attempt to identify
groups (1) in the manner that contemporaries have labeled them as populations and (2) how individual groups have
distinguished themselves both from one another and from other ethnic and racial groups in the particular historical
era under evaluation.
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her heritage as she recounted the formative details of her life, including meeting my
grandfather in his hometown of Aguas Calientes, Mexico and their collective
journey into Colorado. Then all of a sudden she stopped, grasped my hands, looked
me squarely in the eye, and said: "Mijito, 61 nunca me dijo que 6l fuera Indio."
My grandfather's indigenous roots did not seem, at least through my immature
and uncritical eyes, like such a revelation. His skin was a deep and weathered
bronze. He did not have any facial hair. His head, even in advanced age, still had
wisps of the black coal hair of his youth. And although he had long ago embraced
Pentecostal Christianity as his chosen faith, he would often speak of the profound
and enduring relationship that we, as human beings, had with an equally important
trinity: the earth, the water, and the sky. Yet, my grandmother had chosen to ignore
and even deny the racial meanings ascribed to such physical and cultural
characteristics, while she herself had recognized his and her collective differences
from their American, English-speaking neighbors. Perhaps, and this is only
speculation, my grandmother inexplicably recognized that my grandfather's mixedrace indigenous background, and to a lesser extent her own, explained the social
differences and color line that they encountered in the United States, no matter how
much they tried to acculturate or assimilate into the mainstream of their community.
My grandmother's comment surprised me because her own racial cognizance was
not my experience. Born in Denver, Colorado in 1973, I came of age in a
metropolitan area divided along what the U.S. Supreme Court described as the "triethnic" lines of Anglos, African Americans, and Hispanos.3 During the early years

3. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1,413 U.S. 189, 197 (1973). The terminology used to describe a heterogeneous
and socially complex Spanish-surnamed community in this Article has a contentious and by no means settled
genealogy. In fact, the changing terms themselves reflect important transformations in the racial construction of
Spanish-surnamed people in the United States. Accordingly, I utilize the term "Latina/o" broadly, but, where
appropriate, I use terms in the various ways that legal actors and Spanish-surnamed individuals or groups have
labeled populations and distinguished themselves both from one another and from other racial groups in particular
historical moments. I argue below that Keyes represents a constitutional reassessment about the racial positioning
of Latina/os in the U.S. color line as a distinct and identifiable "non-White" and possibly "non-Black" group. See
infra Part 11.
The U.S. Supreme Court's conclusion is particularly surprising given its past decisions that have
treated Latina/os as "Whites." See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 477 (1954). As one assessment of
Hernandez pointed out, every party in the case "argued that Mexican Americans were white." Ian Haney L6pez,
Race and Colorblindness After Hernandez and Brown, 25 CHmcANo-LATNo L. REV. 61, 63 (2005) [hereinafter
L6pez, Race and Colorblindness]. Much has recently been written about the Whiteness and "other-White"
positioning of Latina/os in Hernandez. E.g., id. at 63-67; Ian F. Haney L6pez, Race, Ethnicity, Erasure: The
Salience of Race to LatCritTheory, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1143 (1997) (detailing the inconsistent racialization of Mexican
Americans as White in Hernandez);George A. Martinez, The Legal Constructionof Race: Mexican-Americansand
Whiteness, 2 HARV. LATNO L. REV. 321 (1997) (exploring the various ways that legal actors in judicial opinions
have considered Mexican Americans to be White); George A. Martinez, Legal Indeterminacy,Judicial Discretion
and the Mexican-American LitigationExperience, 1930-1980, 27 U.C. DAviS L. REV. 555, 563-65 (1994) (noting
the ways that Mexican American litigants claimed Whiteness in public accommodation swimming pool cases);
Clare Sheridan, "Another White Race: "Mexican Americans and the Paradox of Whiteness in Jury Selection, 21
LAW & HIST. REV. 109 (2003) (examining the various ways that claims to Whiteness both benefited and hurt
Mexican American litigants in school integration and jury selection cases prior to Hernandez). Others, however,
have recently questioned whether the line between Whiteness and non-Whiteness in Hernandez was so stark and
instead was representative of the U.S. Supreme Court's emerging recognition of a multiracial nation. See Kevin R.
Johnson, Hemandez v. Texas: Legacies of Justice andInjustice, 25 CHtCANO-LATINO L. REV. 153, 169-82 (2005).
One scholar has emphasized the "convergence" of interests at work between the remedy that the U.S. Supreme
Court extended to the Mexican American litigants and the racialized politics of the Cold War. Richard Delgado,
Rodrigo's Roundelay: Hemandez v. Texas and the Interest-ConvergenceDilemma, 41 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
23 (2006).
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of my primary school education, I was bussed to schools with students from all of
these groups. I came to associate and differentiate myself in relation to these social
divisions. Yet, being Chicano held a particular resonance. I knew of El Movimiento4
and my city's prominent role in articulating not only Chicano politics5 but also a
distinct Chicano racial identity. In 1969, for instance, Denver's Chicana/os hosted
the first of several National Youth Liberation Conferences. 6 It was during this
inaugural event that delegates drafted El Plan Espiritualde Aztldn.7 As a Mexican
American Declaration of Independence, El Plan emphasized that Chicana/os and
other Latina/os were neither White nor Black nor a fully indigenous group but were
instead the amalgamation of all; they were a "bronze" people with a historical
trajectory centered squarely in the United States.8 Though I learned very little
formally about the Chicano Movement and its racial politics in the Denver Public
Schools-a decision that I would later discover was the result of a rejected
desegregation decree9-- its spirit reverberated in the Mexican American community,
from the handshakes that I learned at an early age to the compelling and wrenching
testimony that I often heard from my parents, my family, and our family friends
about being Brown in a White world.
Such experiences impacted me in a very profound way and drove my decision to
enter graduate school at the University of Michigan. First as a graduate student in
the Department of History and later in the law school, I had an unprecedented
opportunity to study, explore, and make my own contribution toward understanding
the dynamics of Latina/os, race, history, and the law.' ° Little did I realize that my
own life and experiences would become a formative case study. Not long after I
entered law school, I discovered that I was part of the admitted University of
Michigan Law School first year class that Barbara Grutter wanted to join. Soon

4. "El Movimiento" refers to the Chicano Movement and is used as an umbrella term to describe the variety
of civil rights measures pursued by Mexican Americans during the 1960s and 1970s. For a brief discussion of El
Movimiento's diverse politics, see David Montejano, Introduction: On the Question of Inclusion, in CHICANO
POLITICS AND SOCIETY INTHE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY, at xi, xvii-xviii (David Montejano ed., 1999).
5. David Montejano describes the "politics of protest" that took place between 1965 and 1975 in the
Mexican American communities of the United States. Montejano, supra note 4, at xvii. According to Montejano,
the cross-class political mobilization of Mexican Americans articulated "a unifying nationalist vision that in its more
militant guises was separatist. The activists took the pejorative lower-class label of Chicano and Chicana and
transformed it into a powerful political identity." Id.; see also GEORGE MARISCAL, BROWN-EYED CHILDREN OF THE
SUN: LESSONS FROM THE CHICANO MOVEMENT, 1965-1975, at 5-11 (2005) (highlighting the influence of "Third
World anticolonial struggles, 'national liberation movements', [and] the existence of a youth counterculture" on
shaping a distinct Chicano political movement); ERNESTO B. VIGIL, THE CRUSADE FOR JUSTICE: CHICANO
MILITANCY AND THE GOVERNMENT'S WAR ON DISSENT 3-17 (1999); Tom I. Romero, 11,Of Race and Rights: Legal
Culture, Social Change, and the Making of a Multiracial Metropolis, Denver 1940-1975 (2004) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Michigan) (on file with author) (exploring the rise of a racialized Chicano identity vis-Avis the racial construction of other groups in a post-World War II urban setting).
6. VIGIL, supra note 5, at 95-97.
7. Id. at 97-98.
8. Id. at 97-100.
9. See infra Part Ill.
10. In addition to having the opportunity to study with Professors George Sdmchez and Maria Montoya, my
graduate student colleagues included the current New Mexico State Historian, Estevan Rael y Galvdz, and current
Professors John McKieman-Gonzales (University of Texas), Natalia Molina (University of California-San Diego),
Adrian Burgos (University of Illinois), Pablo Mitchell (Oberlin College), Elena Gutierrez (University of IlinoisChicago), and Frank Guridy (University of Texas).
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after, lawyers for the Center for Individual Rights filed Grutter v. Bollinger," and
Grutter and her legal team successfully subpoenaed my admissions file to the law
school. Most striking in this regard was the litigation's fixation on my self-identified
membership in a "minority" group. Rather than asking the trial court to subpoena
the admissions files of all students, the litigation intentionally targeted only certain
"minority" students and assessed .our admissions vis-A-vis Grutter based solely on
this fact. This litigation strategy mirrored a common tendency to lump members of
all "minority" groups together despite being racialized in very different ways. In
what may have been the most representative example of this process during my time
in law school, one of my fellow law students declared the following in a "public
forum" held by two Michigan lawmakers opposing the university's admissions
program: "[M]aybe they're really not my equal. Do I want to be in a study group
with this person? I just don't know anything about them anymore."12
As part of "them," racialized "minorities" on campus, including myself, sought
to embrace and exclaim our differences based upon our understanding of who we
were in relation to a White/non-White color line. In a public statement about
Grutter,for instance, the Latino Law Students Association (LLSA) at the University
of Michigan, an organization of which I was a part, emphasized that "Latinos, along
with otherpeople of color, continue to be discriminated against as individuals, as a
group, personally, and institutionally." 3 Thus, when the U.S. Supreme Court finally
decided the merits of Grutterv. Bollinger in 2003, Justice O'Connor' s statement that
"race unfortunately still matters" in the United States 4 represented perhaps the
biggest understatement and most obvious part of the decision. Although many
commentators have refused to recognize the contemporary impact of race in the
United States, Barbara Grutter's case against the University of Michigan Law
School, along with the subsequent tensions and conditions that it caused, highlighted
the way that race and color-in all of their complexities and protean meaningsmatter for all of us in receiving a primary, secondary, and higher education in this
country.

11. 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (holding that a law school admissions process that considered race as one
factor among many did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution because the program was narrowly tailored to serve the compelling interest of attaining a diverse
student body).
12. Jon Swartz, Remarks at the Public Forum in Shelby Township, Michigan (Sep. 30, 1997), quoted in
Trevor W. Coleman, Editorial, StereotypicalThinking Marsthe Debate on Affirmative Action, DErROIT FREE PRESS,
Oct. 2, 1997, at 14A. Another person at the rally, who was described as a "soft-spoken" and "congenial" woman,
made the following troubling statement in denouncing affirmative action: "Even during the days of slavery, the
[white] indentured servant had it much more difficult than the slaves... Indentured servants had to work during
pregnancy. The slave had the time off because the slave carried the master's baby. So, there were preferences for
blacks even back then!" Rebecca Paquette, Remarks at the Public Forum in Shelby Township, Michigan (Sept. 30,
1997), quoted in Coleman, supra, at 14A (first alteration in original).
13. Latino Law Students Ass'n, Affirmative Action Statements, 5 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 222, 222 (1998)
(emphasis added).
14. Grutter,539 U.S. at 333 (emphasis added).
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I. INTRODUCTION: LATINA/OS, LAW, RACE, AND COLOR INBETWEENESS BEFORE AND BETWIXT KEYES AND GRUTTER
My personal experiences recounted in the prologue of this Article, similar to the
experiences of countless other Latina/o students and educators in the United States
since the 1970s, highlight the complicated, inconsistent, and dramatic transformation
of the legal meanings and consequences of color and race in the final decades of the
twentieth century.1 5 Perhaps nowhere in U.S. law is this process more perceptible
than in the interaction of the nation's courts with its Latina/o student population
during this era in which the judiciary has designed desegregation orders,16 evaluated
bilingual education programs, 7 and appraised the constitutionality of affirmative
action admissions plans. 8 Indeed, litigation in each instance has demonstrated a
fundamental reevaluation of the boundaries between Whiteness and non-Whiteness
in American culture and life along with a substantial degree of apprehension
regarding the racial placement of Latina/os in relation to this color line in the
nation's legal order.
Accordingly, this Article is an exploration of the legal construction of the racial
identity of Latina/os in the years between the Keyes 9 and Grutter2° decisions. While
these cases arejurisprudential bookends to my personal understanding of race, color,
law, and Latina/os in the United States, the legal efforts of Latina/os to achieve
educational equality via litigation provide a coherent, if inconsistent, body of
jurisprudence through which we can understand the racial construction and color
positioning of Latina/os in contemporary U.S. legal discourse about Whiteness and
non-Whiteness.
To make better sense of these arguments and those that will follow, it is critical
to conceptualize the distinction between race and color. As one recent study
reinforces, the idea of race and its meaning is so imprecise that it is a "pernicious
concept"-particularly in its application in law and its interpretation in
jurisprudence. 2' As countless other scholars have demonstrated, race is still too often

15. Like many other Latina/os in academia, my personal history has served to structure and shape my
research interests. As scholars, however, we are faced with a choice. We can, in the words of Chon Noriega,
objectify these personal histories "as a set of artifacts" that one "could isolate, understand, narrate, and thereby
master." Chon A. Noriega, Research Note, in I AM AZ'rLAN: THE PERSONAL ESSAY IN CHICANO STUDIES 25, 30
(Chon A. Noriega & Wendy Belcher eds., 2004). Or, in the altemative, the Latina/o scholar can embrace and center
this history in order to clearly articulate the role that he or she plays as an intellectual, an actor, and/or a source of
inspiration or caution in the topic of his or her study. Though "our place within our work" and world can pose a
troubling intellectual "conundrum," these personal histories provide powerfully important lessons and parables
about the obstacles, pathos, contradictions, differences, commonalities, and compassion of the collective self. Id.
at 31. For a generation of Latina/o scholars, like myself, whose entire educational experience has been substantively
and profoundly shaped by being Latina/o-from the "Hispanic" categorization in educational policy to our training
in Latina/o studies-our scholarship reflects our role as writers, actors, and ideological symbols in the intellectual
and historical processes.
16. See infra Part H.
17. See infra Part H.
18. See infra Part IV.
19. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
20. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
21.

(2004).

Sharona Hoffman, Is There a Placefor "Race" as a Legal Concept?, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1093, 1136-44
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talked about and understood as simply a physical and genetic construct 22 rather than
a social and historical construct based on ideas, attitudes, consciousness, identity,
ideology, and, most importantly, power.2 ' To be sure, one's access to power in the
United States has been fundamentally dependent upon his or her racial position in
a social system defined by a seemingly precise color line.24 Color, as I propose to
use it in this Article, like other reputable scholarly conceptions of race, 25 is not a
physical description of Whiteness and non-Whiteness. Rather, it is a legal and extralegal category that has been used to extend or deny countless resources, rewards,
and benefits. In U.S. history, one's social relationship (often defined by law) to a
White color line has been the penultimate marker of access to opportunities and
rewards.26 Thus, despite contested, changing, and multiple conceptions of race in
U.S. history that create, in the words of one scholar, "discursive messiness" between
race and color,27 the distinction is "crystal clear" when it comes to whether one's
color categorization gives him or her access to legal remedies and the rewards of
Whiteness.28

22. E.g., Jonathan Kahn, How a Drug Becomes "Ethnic": Law, Commerce, and the Production of Racial
Categoriesin Medicine, 4 YALEJ. HEALTHPOL'YL. & ETHICS 1 (2004) (discussing a drug company's consideration
of race in creating a heart medication that was intended to be marketed exclusively to African Americans).
23. See generally GARY GERSTLE, AMERICAN CRUCIBLE: RACE AND NATION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

(2001) (detailing the fundamental role of racial nationalism shaping the modem United States); MICHAEL OMI &
HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE 1960s TO THE 1990s (2d ed. 1994)

(explaining the influence of the nation-state in distributing resources along racialized lines); DAVID T. WELLMAN,
PORTRAITS OF WHITE RACISM (2d ed. 1993) (detailing the ways that racism works to reinforce the structural
advantages that Whites have obtained in U.S. society); Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, The New Racism: Racial Structure
in the United States, 1960s-1990s, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND NATIONALITY N THE UNITED STATES: TOWARD THE

TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 55 (Paul Wong ed., 1999) (exploring legal and normative changes in the 1960s that
contributed to colorblind racism that benefited Whites); Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, Rethinking Racism: Toward a
StructuralInterpretation,62 AM. SOC. REV. 465 (1996) (arguing for a theory of racial discrimination that accounts
for collective economic and political advantages derived from racial thinking); Stephen Cornell & Douglas
Hartmann, Conceptual Confusions andDivides: Race, Ethnicity, and the Study of Immigration,in NOT JUST BLACK
AND WHITE: HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON IMMIGRATION, RACE, AND ETHNICrrY IN THE

UNITED STATES 23 (Nancy Foner & George M. Fredrickson eds., 2004) (outlining how racial understandings have

differentially impacted ethnic immigrants in the United States).
24. See THOMAS A. GUGLIELMO, WHITE ON ARRIVAL: ITALIANS, RACE, COLOR, AND POWER IN CHICAGO,
1890-1945, at 6-7 (2003); see also IAN F. HANEY-L6PEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE

1-36 (1996).
25. See supra note 23.
26. See, e.g., GUGLIELMO, supra note 24, at 7-9; see also MATTHEW FRYE JACOBSON, WHITENESS OF A
DIFFERENT COLOR: EUROPEAN IMMIGRANTS AND THE ALCHEMY OF RACE (1998) (documenting the ways in which
European immigrants to the United States claimed and were accorded the privileges of identifying as White); IRA
KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE: AN UNTOLD HISTORY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN

TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2005) (exploring how the New Deal preserved a strict racial hierarchy by
benefiting almost exclusively poor and middle class Whites); GEORGE LIPSITZ, THE POSSESSIVE INVESTMENT IN
WHITENESS: How WHITE PEOPLE PROFIT FROM IDENTITY POLITICS (rev. ed. 2006) (detailing historical policies and
legislation that expressly excluded non-White groups from entitlements); Eric Amesen, Whiteness and the
Historians' Imagination, 60 INT'L LAB. & WORKING-CLASS HIST. 3 (2001) (challenging the assertions by some
historians of the non-White status of various immigrant groups because members of such groups had tremendous

color privileges and advantages).
27.

GUGLIELMO, supranote 24, at 9.

28. For example, in his study of late nineteenth and early twentieth century Italian immigration to Chicago,
Professor Thomas Guglielmo argued that "while Italians suffered greatly for their putative racial undesirability as
Italians,... they still benefited in countless ways from their privileged color status as whites." Id.
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Because this analysis focuses on the post-Brown v. Board of Education29 era of
school desegregation, it is helpful to briefly discuss how race, color, and ethnic
understandings came to be distinguished during this formative time. In an attempt
to distance themselves from the violent consequences of biological determinism in
the wake of World War 11,30 scholars, social scientists, and policy makers of that era
simplified the "messy" distinction between race and color in the United States, often
with the best intentions. 3' The resulting terminology jointly, if unevenly, settled into
our current nomenclature that collapses color and racial designations: the Black
(African American) race, the Brown (Latino) race, the Red (American Indian) race,
and the Yellow (Asian American/Pacific Islander) race.32 Accordingly, "new terms
like 'ethnicity' and old ones like 'nationality' emerged to explain differences
previously thought to be based on race but not color., 33 Moreover, such terms
carried very different understandings about power for different people as expressed
by one's position in relation to a color line. Whereas race/color distinctions came to
be understood as being based largely upon subjective and involuntary physical
characteristics and were almost always based on hierarchical and exploitative
relationships, ethnicity came to be conceptualized as a manifestation of language
and religion, which is based on one's ability to voluntarily associate, and is
constitutive of a pluralistic egalitarian Social order.34 Significantly, a new discursive
messiness appeared in such racial and ethnic distinctions. If the color line in the
United States had historically been drawn between Whites and Blacks,35 where

29. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
30.

ALEXANDRA MINNA STERN, EUGENIC NATION: FAULTS AND FRONTIERS OF BETTER BREEDING IN

MODERN AMERICA 4-5, 13 (2005) (explaining the shift in scientific discourse away from one based on racial
taxonomies "that placed whites and Europeans at the apex of civilization, blacks and Africans on the bottom rungs,
and nearly everyone else" in the middle).
31.

See Romero, supra note 5, at 115-25, 135-41.

32. Id.; see generally MATTHEW PRATT GLJTERL, THE COLOR OF RACE IN AMERICA 1900-1940 (2001);
JACOBSON, supra note 26.

33. GUGLIELMO, supra note 24, at 9. Professor Guglielmo describes this as the "'ethnicizing' of a racial
identity" rather than the racialization of ethnic identity. Id. at 178 n.8; see also Victoria Hattam, Ethnicity: An
American Genealogy, in NOT JUST BLACK AND WHITE, supranote 23, at 42, 45-52 (assessing changing terminology
in ethnic and racial categorization of American Jews after World War I); RICHARD D. ALBA, ETHNIC IDENTITY: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF WHITE AMERICA (1990) (documenting the decline of recognizable ethnic differences among
Americans who descended from European immigrants and their subsequent embrace of a White identity). Critically,
this process would, in the post-war period, work both ways for Latina/os. See infra notes 46-50 and accompanying
text.
34. See RICHARD JENKINS, RETHINKING ETHNICITY: ARGUMENTS AND EXPLORATIONS 74-87 (1997); OMI
& WINANT, supra note 23, at 9-23; Cornell & Hartmann, supra note 23, at 26-29.
35. The primary and secondary literature in this regard is extensive. For a general overview of works that
have been extremely useful for me in understanding the legal construction of Whiteness and Blackness in the history
of the United States, see RICHARD DELGADO, THE RODRIGO CHRONICLES: CONVERSATIONS ABOUT AMERICA AND

RACE (1995) (utilizing narrative to understand the legal formation and reification of racial categories); A. LEON
HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD

(1978) (detailing the emergence of color considerations in colonial legislation and jurisprudence); A. LEON
HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS AND THE PRESUMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL

PROCESS (1996) (outlining the inconsistent logic of color in U.S. law and jurisprudence into the twentieth century).
While no one can deny the centrality of the White/Black color line in U.S. history, other racialized color lines have
profoundly shaped the nation as well. See generally TOMAS ALMAGUER, RACIAL FAULT LINES: THE HISTORICAL
ORIGINS OF WHITE SUPREMACY INCALIFORNIA (1994) (detailing the differential racialization of Mexicans, Asians,
American Indians, African Americans, and Whites in nineteenth century California); STUART BANNER, HOW THE
INDIANS LOST THEIR LAND: LAW AND POWER ON THE FRONTIER (2005) (documenting the primary role of legal
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would the nation's fastest growing "ethnic" groups fall in relation to a color line that
had inconsistently treated members of each of those groups as White, Black, or
neither?
. That such issues would occupy the nation's legal machinery is indicative of the
very different understanding about the meaning of color in the late twentieth
century. This is evidenced by the contradictory reactions of my grandmother and
myself to my grandfather's racial identity, as well as to our own. Indeed, these
reactions are not very surprising given the legal restructuring of color and racial
categorization during our lifetimes. My grandparents came of age in a time when
almost all federal and state laws either accepted people of Latin American descent
as White or did not explicitly define them as non-White, Black, or Indian.36
Although this theoretically entitled many Spanish-surnamed residents to all of the
benefits of Whiteness-from the ability to naturalize as free White people and to
attend "Caucasian" schools to the ability to marry Anglo partners, to ride with
Whites on public railroads, or to feel secure in their property-there were many
Latina/os who found that legalized "Whiteness" had its limits. 37 Indeed, law and
jurisprudence systematically worked to move Latina/os to the non-White side of the
color divide.38 Such a shift is apparent in the systematic dispossession of Mexicans'
land in the decades following the end of the Mexican American War in 1848, 39 the
physical marking of Mexican bodies as they crossed the border (or were denied

institutions in shifting the balance of power to White settlers in land struggles with American Indians); ANDREW
GYORY, CLOSING THE GATE: RACE, POLITICS, AND THE CHINESE EXCLUSION ACT (1998) (highlighting the ways that
race contributed to the first federal law that banned a group of immigrants from settling in the United States); PEDRO
A. MALAVET, AMERICA'S COLONY: THE POLITICAL AND CULTURAL CONFLICT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND
PUERTO RICO (2004) (discussing the role of U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence in making Puerto Ricans secondclass citizens); LINDSAY G. ROBERTSON, CONQUEST BY LAW: How THE DISCOVERY OF AMERICA DISPOSSESSED
INDIGENOUS PEOPLE OF THEIR LAND (2005) (detailing how legal doctrines become far removed from their
contextual moorings and have disastrous consequences for non-White groups); Lucy E. SALVER, LAWS HARSH AS
TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING OF MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW (1995) (describing the centrality
of Chinese immigrants in shaping and being shaped by immigration law, jurisprudence, and policy); STERN, supra
note 30 (documenting the role of eugenic law and jurisprudence in maintaining a color/race line in the United
States).
36. Several authors have extensively discussed the legal treatment and racial definition of Latina/os in the
history of the United States. E.g., THE LATINO/A CONDITION: A CRITICAL READER (Richard Delgado & Jean
Stefancic eds., 1998); see also, e.g., IAN F. HANEY L6PEZ, RACISM ON TRIAL: THE CHICANO FIGHT FOR JUSTICE
15-40 (2003); Neil Foley, Straddlingthe Color Line: The Legal Constructionof Hispanic Identity in Texas, in NOT
JUST BLACK AND WHITE,supra note 23, at 341, 341-57; L6pez, Race and Colorblindness,supra note 3, at 64-75.
By the beginning of World War II, the U.S. Census had officially categorized most Spanish-surnamed Americans
as White. Thomas A. Guglielmo, Fighting for Caucasian Rights: Mexicans, Mexican Americans, and the
TransnationalStrugglefor Civil Rights in World War 1I Texas, 92 J. AM. HIST. 1212, 1215-16 (2006); see also
Mario T. Garcfa, Mexican Americans and the Politics of Citizenship: The Case of El Paso, 1936, 59 N.M. HIST.
REV. 187, 199-200 (1984) (describing the strong negative reaction of Mexican Americans in El Paso in 1936 to
their short-lived legal classification as "colored").
37. See Laura E. G6mez, Off-White in an Age of White Supremacy: Mexican Elitesand the Rights of Indians
and Blacks in Nineteenth-Century New Mexico, 25 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 9, 58-59 (2005).
38. See Guglielmo, supra note 36, at 1216.
39. See MARiA E. MONTOYA, TRANSLATING PROPERTY: THE MAXWELL LAND GRANT AND THE CONFLICT
OVER LAND IN THE AMERICAN WEST, 1840-1900, at 157-90 (2002); see also Guadalupe T. Luna, Chicana/Chicano
Land Tenure in the AgrarianDomain: On the Edge of a "Naked Knife, " 4 MICH. J. RACE & L. 39 (1998) (discussing
the dispossession of Chicana/os' property interests in the American Southwest following the Mexican American
war).
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entry) in the early decades of the twentieth century,' their exclusion or segregation
from White public facilities, 4' and the intense policing and surveillance of Mexican
neighborhoods and young men.42 These realities reinforced "powerful ideas,
attitudes, assumptions, and stories about [Latina/os]... that not only demeaned and
dehumanized them but also explained, justified, and nurtured the system of
inequality. 4 3 While there is much debate about the extent to which Latina/os ever
encountered the systematic disfranchisement, segregation, exclusion, and violence
that African Americans did, there is little doubt that the majority of Latina/os never
enjoyed the full power and privilege of Whiteness during the formative years of my
grandmother's life."n In the dominant Black/White color order of the early to midtwentieth century in the United States, Mexicans and Mexican Americans, like my
grandmother, were legally viewed, as Professor Thomas Guglielmo persuasively
argues, as "a truly in-between people, neither black nor white, and truly
disadvantaged. 45
The civil rights movement of the Cold War years, however, fundamentally
reconfigured the color "in-betweeness" that Mexicans, Mexican Americans, and
other Latina/os encountered between social practice and the legal categorization of
their racial identities. Particularly, as Latina/os moved in large numbers and settled
in the urban metropolises of the United States during and after World War 11, the
law slowly came to formally recognize their non-White status.46 To be sure, this was
an ambivalent development. On the one hand, such categorization merely
institutionalized long-standing social practices, such as the racial profiling of
Latina/os by criminal justice professionals.47 On the other hand, such categorization
provided marginally tangible benefits, which included the distribution of resources
to the Latino community in federal poverty programs48 and the ability to bring a

40. See STERN, supra note 30, at 57-72; see also John McKieman-Gonzalez, Bodies of Evidence:
Representation and Recognition on the Mexican Border (Nov. 21, 2002), http://Iatino.si.edu/researchand
museums/presentations/pdfs/mckiernan-presentation.pdf (discussing the compulsory vaccination of Mexicans
crossing the U.S. border in the early twentieth century).
41.

See MARTHA MENCHACA, RECOVERING HISTORY, CONSTRUCTING RACE: THE INDIAN, BLACK, AND

WHITE ROOTS OF MEXICAN AMERICANS 287-90 (2001); Sheridan, supranote 3, at 135-36.
42. See generally EDWARD J. ESCOBAR, RACE, POLICE, AND THE MAKING OF A POLITICAL IDENTITY:
MEXICAN AMERICANS AND THE Los ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT, 1900-1945 (1999) (describing the events that
led to the "Zoot Suit" riots in Los Angeles in 1943).
43. Guglielmo, supranote 36, at 1216. As Professor Guglielmo points out, "[n]ot all Mexicans and Mexican
Americans experienced this system the same way; gender, class, nationality, skin color, and other factors all
mattered." Id.; see also NEIL FOLEY, THE WHITE SCOURGE: MEXICANS, BLACKS, AND POOR WHITES INTEXAS
COTTON CULTURE (1997) (exploring the impact of racial, social, and economic forces in the discriminatory
experiences encountered by Mexican Americans from the Civil War to World War 11); LINDA GORDON, THE GREAT
ARIZONA ORPHAN ABDUCTION (1999) (describing the factual circumstances behind the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision to uphold Protestant White women's abduction of White orphans who had been delivered to Catholic
Mexican American families at the end of the nineteenth century); GEORGE J. SANCHEZ, BECOMING MEXICAN
AMERICAN: ETHNICITY, CULTURE AND IDENTITY IN CHICANO Los ANGELES, 1900-1945 (1993) (detailing the role

of citizenship, class, and gender in the ability of Mexicans to become Americans).
44. Guglielmo, supra note 36, at 1216.
45. Id.
46. Romero, supra note 5, at 147-61.
47. Id.; see also ESCOBAR, supra note 42, at 104-31; LPEz, supranote 36, at 56-87.
48. See generally Tom I. Romero, II, War of a Much DifferentKind: Poverty and the Possessive Investment
in Color in the Multiracial 1960 United States, 26 CHICANO-LATINO L. REv. 69 (2006).
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cause of action for discrimination in housing, education, and employment. 9 As a
result of such developments, a highly truncated and extremely limited possessive
investment in color emerged among Latina/os,5 ° who for once had an opportunity
to reconcile their social and historical experiences with their treatment under the
law. As people of color, both in social practice and in legal recognition, the later
decades of the twentieth century represented a potential watershed moment
regarding the racial identity of Latina/os and the meaning of the color line in U.S.
law.
This Article examines in great detail the judicial interpretation of the U.S.
Supreme Court's reasoning in 1973 in Keyes that "though of different origins
Negroes and Hispanos... suffer identical discrimination in treatment when compared
with the treatment afforded Anglo students"'" and its more recent statement in
Grutterin 2003 that "race.. .still matters. 52 By focusing on the color construction
of Latina/os in educational equity and related jurisprudence since the 1970s, I
explore how and in what ways racial and ethnic conceptions have mattered for
Latina/o students and educators in litigating their rights in the years since Keyes
legally recognized their non-White status. Building upon scholarship that has
explored the racial and ethnic in-betweeness of Latina/os in contemporary U.S.
law,53 I argue that courts have failed to come to grips with the color re-positioning
of Latina/os that Keyes indicated, which has been subsequently internalized by
Latina/os of my generation. Instead, courts have pursued arguments, analyses, and
remedies that have categorized Latina/os as similar to Blacks, immigrants, and/or
an undifferentiated ethnic minority but very rarely recognize Latina/os as a distinctly
racialized and non-White group.
To make my argument, I trace the legal history of Latina/os and the struggle for
educational equity from the early 1970s until the present day. In particular, I
examine three cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court and their progeny to
explore the role of Latina/os in shaping what I refer to as a "tri-ethnic" jurisprudence
in U.S. law. Part two of this Article focuses on the challenge that Latina/os posed
to school desegregation jurisprudence in the 1960s and 1970s. At the center of such
litigation was the issue of whether Latina/o students should be grouped with the
Black or the White students. While the U.S. Supreme Court eventually indicated that
it was entirely appropriate to consider Latina/os as non-White in cases involving
multiple racialized groups, subsequent jurisprudence indicated that it was not
appropriate to treat Latina/os as their own distinct non-White racial group. Part three
focuses on the difficulties presented by bilingual education and language
discrimination litigation on Latino students. As courts framed their analyses in terms
of ethnic identity and acculturation, they disregarded the color dynamics of the

49. See NANCY MACLEAN, FREEDOM Is NOT ENOUGH: THE OPENING OF THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE

155-84 (2006).
50. See generally Romero, supra note 48.
51. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1,413 U.S. 189, 198 (1973).
52. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003).
53. See, e.g., Taunya Lovell Banks, Mestizaje and the Mexican Mestizo Self.- No Hay Sangre Negra, So
There is No Blackness. 15 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 199 (2006); Rachel F. Moran, Neither Black Nor White, 2 HARv.
LATINO L. REV. 61 (1997); Gloria Sandrino-Glasser, Los Confundidos: De-Conflating Latinos/as' Race and
Ethnicity, 19 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 69 (1998).
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issue. By indicating that language matters, courts have collapsed the racialization
of Latina/os as non-White into a more broadly based ethnic model. Part four
analyzes the racial positioning and placement of Latina/o students in affirmative
action litigation. In contrast to bilingual education jurisprudence, courts in these
cases have consistently classified Latina/os as non-Whites in ways that have made
their experiences either less compelling or no different than other non-White
racialized groups. Collectively, such jurisprudence reinforces the dichotomies of
U.S. law (i.e., Black/White, minority/non-minority, English speaking/non-English
speaking, American/non-American) without confronting the distinct racialization of
Latina/os in American culture and without acknowledging the emergence of
multiple color lines in a racially diverse country. As a consequence of such
inconsistent and ill-conceived jurisprudence, the idea of la raza latina has proven
to be a troubling concept for the U.S. legal system to embrace.
11. WHAT CAN BROWN DO FOR YOU?
In the late 1960s, the Denver Public Schools (DPS) faced intense dissatisfaction
and discord from Mexican American students, parents, and activists. 5 A prominent
figure in the public discussion was Chicano activist Rodolfo "Corky" Gonzales,55
whose epic poem Yo Soy Joaquin resolved for many young Mexican Americans
ambiguities in their own racial identities.56 In one meeting with the DPS Board of
Education in the late fall of 1968, for example, Gonzales argued that "Anglo"
teachers, administrators, and parents had "psychologically destroyed" Denver's
"Mexican American" youth.57 In order to counter decades of prejudice,
discrimination, and disrespect, Gonzales explicitly questioned whether busing would
achieve meaningful integration in the school district.5 8 Instead, Gonzales demanded
that the DPS Board's plan include a philosophy to "enforce the inclusion in all
schools.. .the history of our people, our culture.. .language and contributions to this
country."5 9 Less than a year later, a group of Latino, Black, and White students
filed
60
suit against the DPS Board for maintaining separate and unequal schools.
The inclusion and participation of Latina/os in the lawsuit that followed would
prove to be just as troubling and divisive for the various courts litigating the case as
it was for the DPS Board in the fall of 1968. Indeed, it is likely that one of the
reasons that this case reached the U.S. Supreme Court had much to do with the fact
that, in the decades since Brown v. Board of Education61 was written in 1954, the

54. Tom 1. Romero In,Our Selma Is Here: The Political and Legal Struggle for Educational Equality in
Denver, Colorado,and Multiracial Conundrums in American Jurisprudence,3 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 73, 90-97
(2004).
55. Id. at 73-74; VIGIL, supra note 5, at 81-87.
56. IGNACIO M. GARCIA, CIuCANIsMO: THE FORGING OF A MILITANT ETHOS AMONG MEXICAN AMERICANS

35 (1997).
57. Romero, supra note 5, at 412.
58. According to Gonzales, the integration plan that the school board was considering for implementation
was "obviously not a panacea" and would not "solve the problems of Mexican American youth." Romero, supra
note 54, at 73 (quoting Charles Carter, Rights Leader: Integration Plan Talks Disrupted, DENVER POST, Oct. 27,

1968, at 1).
59. Romero, supra note 5, at 412.
60. Romero, supra note 54, at 96-97.
61. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Court had never decided a school desegregation case that involved a significant
number of Latina/o students.62 Vilma Martinez, General Counsel and President of
the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF), highlighted
some of the challenges that Latina/os faced in standard school desegregation
litigation when she stated, "because no state-wide statute has ever formally
segregated Mexican Americans in public schools, MALDEF has to spend many
hard-earned dollars in the courts of this country to prove what we all knew: that
Mexican American children throughout the southwest have been segregated. 63 As
a threshold matter in the Keyes litigation, Latina/o litigants needed to explain such
segregation in color conscious terms:
[T]he anomalous position of the Chicano-not white, yet not, in the old-style
parlance, "colored"-has been one of the roots of Chicano tragedy in this
country and has produced a history of legal struggle for equal educational
opportunity that has been as difficult as, and at the same time, significantly
different from, that waged by black Americans.'
Because of this legal "tragedy," perhaps it was no surprise that for the first time in
its post-Brown jurisprudence the Court was not in complete agreement about how
the desegregation issues would ultimately be balanced.6 5
This Part examines the manner in which the principles of Brown v. Board of
Education were applied to Latina/o students in Keyes v. School DistrictNo. 1 and
in subsequent cases. 66 Significantly, at precisely the same time that Latina/os began
to appear as litigants and participants in the major school desegregation cases, many
other Latina/os came to recognize the symbolic, didactic, and protean meanings of
Brown in the struggle for civil rights. 67 To be sure, the racial re-imagination within
the Latino community in the late 1960s manifested itself in a struggle by courts in
the early 1970s to precisely define the boundaries of race, color, and ethnicity in
constitutional law. As this Part explores, this struggle would have tremendous
consequences as courts spent a great deal of time and energy trying to determine the
most appropriate and effective measures to understand and respond to the

62. See Christopher Jencks, Busing-The Supreme Court Goes North, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1972,
(Magazine), at 40; James P. Sterba, DenverSchool Busing Succeeds; Social Mixture Called a Factor,N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 26, 1974, at 34.
63. Vilma S. Martinez, Gen. Counsel, Mexican Am. Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Speech at the LULAC
California Supreme Council (Jan. 19, 1974) (transcript available in the Special Collections and University Archives,
Stanford University).
64. Vilma S. Martinez, Gen. Counsel, Mexican Am.Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Speech at the University of
Notre Dame Center for Civil Rights Conference: Brown v. Board of Education Twentieth Anniversary (Mar. 22,
1974) (emphasis added) (transcript available in the Special Collections and University Archives, Stanford
University).
65. See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1,413 U.S. 189, 258-61 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
66. See infra Part H1A-B.
67. See Romero, supra note 54, at 90-97; see also Aspira of N.Y., Inc. v. Bd. of Educ., 423 F. Supp. 647
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (analyzing the right of Latina/o New York City public school students to a bilingual education
according to a decree made pursuant to federal law); Angel A. Amy Moreno de Toro, An Oral History of the Puerto
Rican Socialist Party in Boston, 1972-1978, in THE PUERTO RICAN MOVEMENT: VOICES FROM THE DIASPORA 246,

251-55 (Andrs Torres & Jos6 E. Veldsquez eds., 1998); see generally Steven H. Wilson, Brown over "Other
White": Mexican Americans' Legal Arguments and Litigation Strategy in School DesegregationLawsuits, 21 LAW

& HIST. REV. 145 (2003) (assessing an increasing recognition by Mexican Americans of the need to legally respond
to the desegregation of Mexican American students in the years following Brown).
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segregation of a diverse student body. Paradoxically, while embracing a "brown"
racial identity allowed Latina/os to claim the constitutional guarantees of Brown,
their involvement in school desegregation jurisprudence reinforced their identity as
neither White nor Black and neither fully ethnic nor absolutely racialized.6 8
Meanwhile, the rigid and increasingly formulaic line separating public schools'
minority and majority populations was cemented.
A. Conceptualizinga "Tri-Ethnic" Student Body
When eight "Negro," "Hispano," and "Anglo" families filed suit against the
Denver Public School Board and its administration on June 19, 1969 for
unconstitutionally perpetuating a policy of segregation,69 they entered the uncharted
waters of the nation's post-Brown school desegregation jurisprudence. At the time
that the plaintiffs filed their case, there were no reported school desegregation cases
that specifically involved representatives from all of these groups. 70 Accordingly,
at the center of the court's deliberations would be the extent to which "Hispano" and
"Negro" students could be jointly counted in determining whether segregation
existed in the school district.
In evaluating the case, Judge William Doyle recognized that a firm legal
definition of "segregation" would be hard to achieve. 7' Having grown up and built
his career in a city where racial lines were not constructed solely along Black and
White lines,72 Judge Doyle pointed out that any attempt to place Latina/os and
African Americans "all in one category and utilize the total number as establishing
the segregated character of the school .... is often an over-simplification.... and [to]
'' 3
lump them into a single minority category... remains a problem and a question. 1
Although conceding that African Americans and Latina/os shared economic and
cultural deprivation and discrimination, Judge Doyle argued that "Hispanos have 74
a
wholly different origin, and the problems applicable to them are often different.
Judge Doyle's early written opinions in the case suggest that he conceptualized
these disparate origins as the difference between racial and ethnic animi. Whereas
Judge Doyle indicated that the concentration of Black students in the city was the
result of the conscious maintenance of the city's Black/White color line,75 the
segregation of Latina/o students was the result of bias against the culture of

68. I have previously explored the emergence of Mexican Americans in school desegregation litigation,
particularly in Keyes. Romero, supra note 54, at 97-120. 1 revisit and recast portions of that analysis in this Article.
See infra Part B.A-B.
69. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 313 F. Supp. 61 (D. Colo. 1970).
70. The only other case involving all three groups that was filed in the same time period was Cisneros v.
Corpus Christi Independent School District, 324. F. Supp. 599 (S.D. Tex. 1970). That case, arising in Texas,
involved a district that was largely "Mexican-American" but also included "Anglos" and a small number of "Negro"
students. Id. at 608-12 n.37.
71. Keyes, 313 F. Supp. at 74.
72. See Romero, supra note 54, 136-37 n.262.
73. Keyes, 313 F. Supp. at 69.
74. Id.

75. See id. at 64-67; see also Romero, supra note 54, at 80-90; Frederick D. Watson, Removing the
Barricades from the Northern Schoolhouse Door: School Desegregation in Denver (1993) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Colorado at Boulder) (on file with author).
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Denver's Spanish-surnamed population.7 6 Perhaps recognizing that the line between
racial and ethnic discrimination was not all that precise," Judge Doyle noted that the
mission of federal courts in school desegregation cases was to determine "inequality
based upon race or ethnic origin. "78 Accordingly, Judge Doyle found the schools in
question to be segregated "to the extent that Hispanos, as a group, [were] isolated
in concentrated numbers. 79
Although Judge Doyle's opinion collapsed substantive constitutional differences
between racial and ethnic discrimination, it nevertheless maintained an important
line of color demarcation between White and non-White groups. 80 In doing so,
Judge Doyle described the so-called "minority factor" that exacerbated the problem
of racial concentration. 8' He stated that "minority citizens are products, in many
instances, of parents who received inferior educations and hence the home
environment which is looked to for many fundamental sources of learning and
knowledge yields virtually no educational value., 82 Regardless of the racial or ethnic
origins of such a condition, "the only hope," in Judge Doyle's estimation, was to
bring Latina/o, African American, and other "minority citizens" into contact with
"knowledgeable" (i.e., White) students. 83 According to this reasoning, an integrated
school would include approximately equal numbers of White and non-White
students. 84
Judge Doyle's conflation of racial and ethnic terminology in the Keyes district
court opinion highlighted the different approaches that other courts took or would
take regarding the racial positioning of Latina/os in the nation's legal order. In Judge
Doyle's own circuit, for instance, the U.S. District Court for the District of New
Mexico, roughly three months before the initial Keyes decision was made, refused
to certify "Mexican-Americans" as a class in a school desegregation complaint. 85 In
Lopez Tijerina v. Henry:
The plaintiffs allege[d] [that the "Indo-Hispano" class] is generally characterized
by having Spanish surnames, Mexican, Indian, and Spanish ancestry, and that
76. Keyes, 313 F. Supp. at 73, 77.
77. Judge Doyle's first desegregation order is instructive in this regard. Indeed, his plan included elements
meant to address both racial and ethnic discrimination in the system such as instituting a voluntary transfer policy
out of "inferior" schools to better schools, initiating limited busing to integrate the core city and Park Hill schools
with minority concentrations, and offering compensatory education-including "[h]uman relations training,"
"Spanish language training," and "[c]lasses in Negro and Hispano culture and history." Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1,
313 F. Supp. 90, 96, 99 (D. Colo. 1970).
78. Keyes, 313 F. Supp. at 77 (emphasis added).
79. Id. at 69. Judge Doyle thus tentatively established that a "concentration of either Negro or Hispano
students in the general area of 70 to 75 percent is a concentrated school likely to produce the kind of inferiority
which we are here concerned with." Id. at 77 (emphasis added).
80. Judge Doyle made the following observation: "The plaintiffs have accomplished this by using the name
'Anglo' to describe the white community." Id. at 69.
81. Keyes, 313 F. Supp. at96.

82. Id.
83. Id. at 96-97. Thus, "complete desegregation" sufficient to fulfill "the constitutional requirement" would
be achieved when each of Denver's segregated schools had "an Anglo composition in excess of 50 percent." Id. at
98 (discussing the desegregation of elementary schools).
84. Although Judge Doyle recognized that such a balance "is probably not constitutionally required," he
pointed out that "the desirability of having the minority student population in each of these [elementary] schools
apportioned equally between Negro and Hispano children is apparent." Id.
85. Lopez Tijerina v. Henry, 48 F.R.D. 274 (D.N.M. 1969).
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the class speaks Spanish as a primary or maternal language ....
In connection with
this class, the complaint also designate[d] a class of "non-Indo-Hispano"
meaning only white or Caucasian, or Anglo-American. The classes of "IndoHispano" or "non-Indo-Hispano", [sic] as designated in the complaint, do not
include either Negroes or Indians.

6

The plaintiffs' attempt to complicate the racial identity of Mexican Americans
proved to be their undoing. Indeed, because they described their racialization in
multiethnic and multiracial terms, the court concluded that their own self-definition
was legally unworkable.87 Unless the plaintiffs could establish that the students in
the class clearly, unambiguously, and exclusively belonged to an "Indian," "Negro,"
or "Caucasian" group, they could not claim to be the victims of racial
discrimination. 8 In a place like New Mexico, which has both a rigid multiracial
hierarchy and permeable color lines, the Latino "Indo-Hispano" was, at least for that
court, beyond the pale of constitutional recognition.
In contrast to the treatment of the New Mexican children in Lopez Tijerina, a
Texas federal district court case decided a few months later undertook a more
critical and sustained exploration of the racial positioning of Latina/os in school
desegregation jurisprudence. Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School
District,89 like Keyes, challenged the maintenance of a dual-school system erected
against both "Mexican-American" and "Negro" students. Accordingly, the existence
of "Mexican-Americans" in the case compelled Judge Woodrow Seals to squarely
confront whether Brown and its progeny applied to "Mexican-Americans," and, if
so, what constituted a segregated school when "Negroes" and "Anglos" were
involved.90
To begin his analysis, Judge Seals dealt with the inconsistency surrounding the
terms others used to differentiate between groups and to define discrimination. 9' As
Judge Seals aptly pointed out, such terms were subject to change and re-definition
over time, and all group identification labels-from Anglo, Chicano, and Black to
"ethnic-minority"-were misnomers, dependent upon variances in time, place, and
context. 92 Nevertheless, Judge Seals' opinion could not ignore an overwhelming
litany of historical and social evidence of discrimination by "Anglos" against
Corpus Christi's "Mexican-American" community. 93 Notably, Judge Seals
highlighted the racial consciousness of Latina/os as an important factor in his
decision to consider the group legally non-White: "It seems to this court that
[several] Mexican-American organizations... were called into being in response to

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 275-76.
Id. at 276-77.
See id.
324 F. Supp. 599, 604-05 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
See id.
See id. at 600-01. See generally Steven Harmon Wilson, Some Are Born White, Some Achieve Whiteness,

and Some Have Whiteness Thrust upon Them: Mexican Americans and the Politicsof Racial Classification in the
FederalJudicial Bureaucracy, Twenty-Five Years After Hernandez v. Texas, 25 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 201,

213-18 (2005) (detailing how the racial status of Latina/os in jury selection cases in Texas informed the racial
classification of Latina/o students).
92. Cisneros, 324 F. Supp. at 605 n.27; see also Romero, supra note 54, at 110.
93. Cisneros, 324 F. Supp. at 605-12, 616-23.
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this problem." 94 Also informative for Judge Seals was a larger bureaucratic and
social cognizance of the distinct challenges confronting the Latino community.
According to Judge Seals, "if there were any doubt in this court's mind, this court
could take notice, which it does, of the congressional enactments, governmental
studies and commissions on this problem."95 Collectively, such evidence led Judge
Seals to conclude that "Mexican-Americans" were a socially distinct "ethnic
minority" group, who, like "Negroes," had suffered a long history of past and
present discrimination in Corpus Christi. 96
Attempting to provide language that would have avoided the pitfalls of racial and
ethnic definitions, Judge Seals could not escape describing a very real color line in
the school system:
The constitutional inquiry is concerned with whether a particular
disadvantaged group is being substantially segregated from the more advantaged
group; the constitutional ill is not cured simply by commingling two similarly
disadvantaged groups (the Negroes and the Mexican-Americans), both of which
are substantially segregated from the more advantaged group, which in this case
is the Anglo-American population. 97

Due to the fact that Mexican American and Black students had educational
experiences that were inferior to White students, Judge Seals found that the entire
Corpus Christi school system was unconstitutionally segregated regardless of the
concentration and ratios in particular schools.9 8 At the end of his opinion, Judge
Seals remarked, "We are not a homogeneous people; we are a heterogeneous people;
we have many races, many religions, many colors in America." 99 Indeed, a
reconsideration of race and color differences in places like Denver and San Antonio
allowed these courts to recognize more effectively the inherently unequal and
therefore unconstitutional education and educational facilities in those school
districts.
At the same time, Judge Ben C. Connally opened what he called "another
chapter" in the desegregation of the Houston Independent School District in Ross
v. Eckels.'0° Although the school district in that case enrolled 235,000 students, of
which two-thirds were designated White and one-third Black, 36,000 students
(fifteen percent) were "Spanish-surnamed Americans."'' Because only fifteen
percent of the students enrolled in the school district were "Spanish-surnamed
Americans," the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF)
sought to intervene in the case.

94. Id. at 615 (listing LULAC, the G.I. Forum, and MAYO).
95. Id. at 608 (emphasis added).
96. Id.at 615.
97. Id. at 616 n.48.
98. Id. at 627.
99. Id. (emphasis added).
100. 317 F. Supp. 512, 513 (S.D. Tex. 1970). For a closer look at the racial politics in Ross v. Eckels, see
Wilson, supra note 91, at 213-18.
101. Ross v. Eckels, 434 F.2d 1140, 1141 (5th Cir. 1970).
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Founded in 1967,102 MALDEF played a prominent role in the Texas
desegregation suits.13 From its inception, MALDEF was deeply concerned about
the segregation of Mexican Americans from White students."° In a 1968
memorandum from Jos6 Angel Guti6rrez to Pete Tijerina and Mario Obledo,
Guti6rrez highlighted the "ethnic" triangulation of Texas schools where "Mexicano"
and "Negro" students were segregated on the basis of language and color from
"Anglo" students.'05 The emergence of MALDEF in school desegregation and other
suits provoked correspondingly intense discussions among its supporters about the
imprecise meanings and operations of race and color within the Latino community.
In one letter to the organization in 1968, a person described "professionalized"
Puerto Ricans and Mexican American Volunteer in Service to America (VISTA)
organizers as "White" and "Anglicized 'Gringo[s].""' 6 When the letter writer
suggested that the organizers utilize the phrase "viva la raza" to organize Mexican
Americans, the VISTA organizers replied that using the phrase "is the same as a
negro saying I am a NIGGER."' 17 Deeply concerned, the letter writer concluded
with the following: "I say to you VIVA LA RAZA. I mean long live your race, and
thanks for the great contribution your race has given to Our America.""18 Others also
recognized Latina/os as a non-White racial group. For instance, the Southwest
Intergroup Council noted that the American Southwest "contains a basic minimum
of five distinct racial groups: Anglo, Asian, Black, Chicano and Indian. These
groups each have distinctive cultural attitudes .... Instead of the question of
administration of law, a more fundamental question of the substance of law
dominates this region. ' °9
Despite the increasing recognition of Mexican Americans as non-White, which
was buttressed by decisions such as Keyes and Cisneros, Judge Connally attacked
MALDEF's challenge to the color line in Ross v. Eckels: "Content to be White for
these many years, now, when the shoe begins to pinch, the would-be Intervenors
wish to be treated not as Whites but as an identifiable minority group." ' 10 Judge
Connally subsequently denied MALDEF' s petition to intervene."' Without a Latino

102. San Antonio attorney Pete Tijerina founded MALDEF after receiving a multi-million dollar grant from
the Ford Foundation. Karen O'Connor & Lee Epstein, A Legal Voice for the Chicano Community: The Activities
of the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, 1968-82, in THE MEXICAN AMERICAN
EXPERIENCE: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY ANTHOLOGY 281, 284-85 (Rodolfo 0. de la Garza et al. eds., 1985). The
organization was explicitly modeled after the NAACP's Legal Defense Fund. Id. at 282-84.
103. See Wilson, supra note 91, at 212-15.
104. See, e.g., Memorandum from Josd Angel Gutidrrez on the Tahoka School Situation and the Police
Brutality in Plainview, Texas to Pete Tijerina and Mario Obledo (Sept. 16, 1968) (on file with the Special
Collections and University Archives, Stanford University).

105. See id.
106. Letter from Elizabeth Hanson to Josd Angel Guti6rrez 1 (Oct. 20, 1968) (on file with the Special
Collections and University Archives, Stanford University).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 3.
109. Memorandum from the Sw. Intergroup Council 4 (1971) (on file with the Special Collections and
University Archives, Stanford University).
110. Margaret E. Montoya, A BriefHistory of ChicanaloSchool Segregation:One Rationalefor Affirmative
Action, 12 LA RAZA L.J. 159, 170 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ross v. Eckels, Civ. A. No.
10-444, at 7 (S.D. Tex. May 24, 1971)).
I 11. Ross, Civ. A. No. 10-444. In his memorandum opinion denying the motion, Judge Connally noted that
the Houston Independent School District and other Texas school districts had "'always treated Latin-Americans as
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voice in the case, Judge Connally concluded that the Spanish-surnamed students
were "White" and, in turn, approved a plan that considered those schools that
combined Mexican American with African American students as integrated."1 2 The
Fifth Circuit review of the ruling reinforced Judge Connally's decision and, in the
process, "adjudicated [Latina/os] to be statistically white.""' 3
Keyes, Lopez Tijerina, Cisneros,and Eckels, all written within months of each
other, demonstrate how Latina/os were situated squarely in between conceptions of
Whiteness and Blackness in the U.S. racial order. While the trial courts in Keyes and
Cisneros highlighted the racial repositioning of Latina/os as coterminous with
Blackness in U.S. constitutional law, Lopez Tijerina and Eckels indicated the
continued legal association of the group with Whiteness. It is quite clear in these late
1960s and early 1970s Latino school desegregation cases, however, that both a
potentially more sophisticated language of racial discrimination and a distinct
operation of the color line appeared in the legal discourse. Indeed, one contemporary
study of the Cisneros decision highlighted how "Chicanos"-as "80 percent Native
American," bilingual or exclusive Spanish-speakers, Spanish-surnamed, Catholics
who experienced exclusion in jobs, housing, schools, restaurants, theaters, and
swimming pools as a result of "white superiority"--constituted an identifiable
minority group subject to the full protection and guarantees of U.S. law. 1 4
Ironically, however, arguably the most accurate description of Latina/os, as detailed
in Lopez Tijerina, proved to be unworkable, while the imprecise terms and
understandings of "Hispanos" in Keyes and of "Mexican-Americans" in Cisneros
were sufficiently acceptable "ethnic minority" categories that distinguished
Latina/os from their "Negro" and "Anglo" counterparts." 5 Therefore, the question

of the Anglo or White race"' and that even if Mexican Americans were an identifiable minority group they were
not entitled "'to escape the effects of integration [with blacks]."' Jorge C. Rangel & Carlos M. Alcala, Project
Report: De Jure Segregation of Chicanos in Texas Schools, 7 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 307, 349 n.254 (1972)
(alteration in original) (quoting Ross, Civ. A. No. 10-444).
112. Ross v. Eckels, 317 F. Supp. 512, 514 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
113. Ross v. Eckels, 434 F.2d 1140, 1150 (Clark, J., dissenting). Judge Clark argued that "it is mock justice
when we force the numbers by pairing disadvantaged Negro students into schools with members of this equally
disadvantaged ethnic group." Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
114. Rangel & Alcala, supra note 111, at 350-55. Another contemporary account noted that
Mexican-Americans are considered by some to be a non-white racial group. However, the
predominant view is that Mexican-Americans are white, even though many are mestizos (a
hybrid of white and Indian). Nevertheless, like other white nationality groups who have been
victims of discrimination, for example, the Jewish and Italian-Americans, Mexican-Americans
have inherent characteristics which make them easily identifiable and susceptible to
discrimination. Among these characteristics are brown skin color, a Spanish surname, and the
Spanish language.
Guadalupe Salinas, Comment, Mexican-Americans and the Desegregationof Schools in the Southwest, 8 HOUS.
L. REV. 929, 929 (1971) (first emphasis added).
115. This point may be further refined by the importance of city and neighborhood boundaries in the Keyes
and Cisneroscases as opposed to their importance in the Lopez Tijerina case. In both cases, historical patterns of
neighborhood development (so-called de facto patterns) provided a literal containment and identification of
racialized groups for each court to conceptualize as distinct ethnic "minority groups." See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No.
1, 313 F. Supp. 61, 64-82 (D. Colo. 1970); Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Indep. Sch. Dist., 324 F. Supp. 599, 606-15
(S.D. Tex. 1970). For critical perspectives of the racialization of urban space, see generally THE GEOGRAPHY OF
OPPORTUNITY: RACE AND HOUSING CHOICE IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA (Xavier de Souza Briggs ed., 2005); LLAM
KENNEDY, RACE AND URBAN SPACE IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN CULTURE (2000); EDWARD W. SOJA,
POSTMETROPOLIS: CRITICAL STUDIES OF CITIES AND REGIONS 95-155 (2000).
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remained as to where Latina/os would fall in relation to the color line. Subsequent
desegregation litigation would answer this question and, in turn, suggest the
constitutional limits of being an identifiable "ethnic minority group" in a White and
non-White constitutional order.'16
B. Applying a Tri-Ethnic Jurisprudencein Color Conscious DesegregationLaw
The emergence of Mexican Americans and other "ethnic minorities" in school
desegregation jurisprudence compelled the U.S. Supreme Court to address the
substantive meaning of ethnic terminology in a body of law that had been dominated
by Black and White racial distinctions. Settling on the Keyes case-because it also
addressed the issue of de facto versus de jure segregation-the Court heard oral
arguments in October 1972 and issued a decision in June 1973.17 The various
opinions that were expressed in the case made it clear that a more complex
understanding of race and color would animate the nation's legal discourse. Justice
Brennan's majority opinion pointed out that, unlike cities in the American South,
"Denver [was] a tri-ethnic, as distinguished from a bi-racial, community."' 18 For that
reason, according to Justice Powell's concurrence in part and dissent in part, the
Court needed to "formulate constitutional principles of national rather than merely
regional application."' '9As a threshold matter, the Court was asked to address the0
school.12
color positioning of Latina/os to determine what constituted a segregated
21
In other words, were Latina/os White, Black, or uniquely Latino?'
Like some of his lower court brethren, Justice Brennan pointed out the
complexity of the social situation. He wrote:
What is or is not a segregated school will necessarily depend on the facts of each
particular case. In addition to the racial and ethnic composition of a school's
student body, other factors, such as the racial and ethnic composition of faculty
and staff and the community and administration attitudes toward the school,

must be taken into consideration.'
Further reinforcing this analysis, Brennan noted that "'Hispano' is the term used by
the Colorado Department of Education to refer to a person of Spanish, Mexican, or
Cuban heritage. In the Southwest, the 'Hispanos' are more commonly referred to as
'Chicanos' or 'Mexican-Americans." ' ' 23 Finally, Justice Brennan reiterated the
underlying point made by Judge Doyle that discrimination directed against Latina/os
origins, thus making Denver's schools "tri-ethnic" as
and Blacks has different
' 24
opposed to "bi-racial."'

116. See infra Part ll.B.

117. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1,413 U.S. 189 (1973).
118. id. at 195.
119. Id. at 219 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
120. Id. at 195-97 (majority opinion).
121. Justice Brennan asked whether Judge Doyle was correct in not aggregating "Negroes and Hispanos" in
order "to establish the segregated character of a school." Id. at 196.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 195-96 n.6 (citation omitted).
124. See id. at 195-98.
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Brennan's linguistic shift from race to ethnicity was one explicitly captured in
Judge Seals' decision in Cisneros to identify Mexican Americans and African
Americans as identifiable ethnic minority groups.125 The ethnicity paradigm used by
both courts, however, revealed a much less complicated, if not more restrictive,
understanding about discrimination in post-World War II culture and life in the
United States. As Michael Omi and Howard Winant point out in their study of racial
formation in the United States, "the ethnicity paradigm represents the mainstream
of the modem sociology of race," while during the post-World War II period the
ethnic paradigm highlighted the "triumph of liberalism" over "biologistic" views of
difference. 126 Yet, as Omi and Winant's research warned, the paradigm "was solidly
based in the framework of European (white) ethnicity, and could not appreciate the
extent to which racial inequality differed from ethnic inequality.' 27 Ultimately, this
allowed European immigrants, as "ethnics," to "take their places as 'Americans'
'2
despite the existence of considerable nativist hostility and prejudice against them."' 1
Brown v. Board of Education129 and its mandate for integration (i.e., assimilation)
represented the constitutional entrenchment of the ethnicity paradigm, at least in
relation to the Black/White color line. 30 In this regard, ethnicity proponents were
likely to believe that the Brown decision and the corresponding 1950s and 1960s
civil rights movement, of which it was a part, "was trying to create for blacks the
same conditions that white ethnics had found: 'opportunity' and relative equality
(i.e., the absence of formal discriminatory barriers, however much attitudinal
prejudice may have existed)."''
As the struggle to desegregate the nation's schools moved to the northern and
western states, courts found not only a very different color line than the one
operating in the American South but also perceived an absence of legal (de jure)
discriminatory restrictions.' 32 According to the ethnicity model, the absence of
formal legal barriers in conjunction with thejudicial and administrative enforcement
of recently passed equal opportunity legislation required Black and other non-White
"ethnics" to "follow in their [European] 'predecessors" footsteps. Through hard
work, patience, delayed gratification, etc., blacks [and other minority groups] could
carve out their own rightful place in American society.... Race relations would thus
' 33
continue in what Nathan Glazer was later to call the 'American ethnic pattern.""
Critically, the Supreme Court's shift from a "bi-racial" to a "tri-ethnic" approach,
as well as its ultimate decision in Keyes to maintain the de jure/de facto distinction

125. See Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Indep. Sch. Dist., 324 F. Supp. 599, 607-08 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
126. OMI & WINANT, supra note 23, at 14-15.

127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 16.
Id. at 17. Omi and Winant refer to this process as the "European immigrant model of assimilation." Id.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See generally Anthony Lewis, Since the Supreme Court Spoke: Its Historic Decision on School

DesegregationLaunched "the Racial Decade" in America-Ten Years of IrreversibleRevolution in the Patterns

of Negro-White Relations, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1964 (Magazine). For an academic treatment of the assimilation
perspective, see Harry T. Edwards, The Journey From Brown v. Board of Education to Grutter v. Bollinger: From
RacialAssimilation to Diversity, 102 MICH. L. REV. 944, 963--64 (2004).

131. OMI&WINANT, supra note 23, at 19.
132. See id.
133. Id. (citing NATHAN GLAZER & DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, BEYOND THE MELTING POT (2d ed. 1970)).
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in its equal protection j urisprudence,'3 thus becomes explainable given the ethnicity
1 35
paradigm's dominance in American intellectual, social, and public thought.
The ethnicity model also explains another important move made in Justice
Brennan's majority opinion in Keyes, namely his decision to count Blacks and
Latina/os as a single "minority" group in order to establish the existence of
segregated schools. 36 Relying on a series of studies on Mexican American students
undertaken by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, the Court found that "Negroes
and Hispanos in Denver suffer identical discrimination in treatment when compared
with the treatment afforded Anglo students. In that circumstance, we think
petitioners are entitled to have schools with a combined predominance of Negroes
and Hispanos included in the category of 'segregated' schools.' 37 By combining
Black and Latina/o students as undifferentiated and "identical" members of a
minority group, the Court reinforced the predominant ethnic model and assumed
that all so-called minority groups would share a similar process of integration. Yet,
by collapsing the language of race into that of ethnicity, the Court redefined what
had once been an ambivalent color line for Latina/os. Whereas in Hernandez v.
Texas constitutional law had allowed Latina/os to become an "identifiable class" as
an "other-White" group in the same year that Brown v. Board of Education was
decided, 3 ' Keyes unmistakably placed Latina/os on the non-White side of the
nation's color line. 39 For this reason, the decision further declared that
discrimination against one non-White group--of which Latina/os were now a

134. Justice Brennan described the holding in Keyes as follows:.
[W]e hold that a finding of intentionally segregative school board actions in a meaningful
portion of a school system, as in this case, creates a presumption that other segregated schooling
within the system is not adventitious. It establishes, in other words, a prima facie case of
unlawful segregative design on the part of school authorities, and shifts to those authorities the
burden of proving that other segregated schools within the system are not also the result of
intentionally segregative actions... We emphasize that the differentiating factor between dejure
segregation and so-called defacto segregation... is purpose or intent to segregate. Where school
authorities have been found to have practiced purposeful segregation in part of a school system,
they may be expected to oppose system-wide desegregation, as did the respondents in this case,
on the ground that their purposefully segregative actions were isolated and individual events,
thus leaving plaintiffs with the burden of proving otherwise.
Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973).
135. The courts in Keyes and Cisneros, however, were not unique in this regard. Other federal institutions,
as they became acutely aware of the nation's Spanish-surnamed population, contributed heavily to a tangled race,
color, and ethnic discourse. In the 1970s, for instance, the Federal Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
institutionalized the use of the term "Hispanic" to collectively describe "a person of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban,
Central or South American or other Spanish culture or origin." OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OMB DIRECTIVE No.
15, RACE AND ETHNIC STANDARDS FOR FEDERAL STATISTICS AND ADMINISTRATIVE REPORTING (1977); see also
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, PERSONS OF SPANISH ORIGIN IN THE UNITED STATES (1979). Although OMB
guidelines indicated that race played no role in the classification of "Hispanics," the very act of amalgamating
highly diverse social and cultural groups was unambiguously a racial process guised in pan-ethnic terms. See OMI
& WNANT, supranote 23, at 17-19. Indeed, this was part of the nomenclature of the intellectual community of the
time and indicated an ideological move to re-imagine race. See supra notes 126-133 and accompanying text; see
also David E. Hayes-Bautista & Jorge Chapa, Latino Terminology: Conceptual Bases for Standardized
Terminology, 77 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 61, 61-68 (1987).
136. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 197-98.
137. Id. at 197 & n.8, 198; see also Romero, supra note 54, at 113-14.
138. See supra note 3; see also infra note 322 and accompanying text.
139. As Justice Brennan declared, there was "much evidence that in the Southwest Hispanos and Negroes
have a great many things in common." Keyes, 413 U.S. at 197.
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part-created a presumption of discrimination against other non-White groups in the
"tri-ethnic" city.'4° While such reasoning allowed the Court to use a more expansive
definition of discrimination than that which was applicable to the rest of the United
States, it also collapsed important differences between racialized groups around a
color line while further obscuring the extent to which racial inequality differed from
ethnic inequality. The deployment of the language of race and color in such ethnic
terms would invariably complicate any attempt to provide an effective and
multifaceted remedy to a "tri" or "multi" racial student body.
Such complications, however, were not so obvious after the U.S. Supreme
Court's 1973 Keyes decision. Indeed, what Judge Doyle failed to accomplish in
establishing standards for a segregated school by treating Latina/o and Black
students as their own separate and distinct student bodies, he attempted to
accomplish at the remedial phase of the litigation by providing one remedy for
41
Blacks (busing) and another for Latina/os (bilingual and bi-cultural education).
This bifurcation, moreover, was the position explicitly endorsed by a new actor in
the Keyes litigation: the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund. As
early as 1969, MALDEF understood that "the goal of school integration [for
Chicana/os] possibly conflicted with another goal sought to be effected by
MALDEF, that of bilingual education." 142 Particularly, MALDEF believed that "[a] s
the goal of a unitary school system is approached the difficulties for providing a
bilingual education are compounded and perhaps impossible to overcome. It would
seem, then, that only one of these goals [busing or bilingual education] can be
vigorously pursued."' 43 The Supreme Court's decision in Keyes, however, provided
on the
a unique opportunity to reevaluate such an analysis based fundamentally
44
proposition that Latina/os were neither "other-White" nor "other-Black."'
An analysis of MALDEF' s emergence in Keyes provides a revealing insight into
how Latina/os began to conceptualize race, color, and ethnicity.' 45 Perhaps most
important, the organization publicly took the position that Latina/os were a distinct
racial group. For instance, in the preamble to their creation of the National Institute
for Law and Justice, MALDEF noted, "We, the people of La Raza....hereby declare
the National Institute for Law and Justice will serve as a national and local advacate
146
[sic] for La Raza Rights guaranted [sic] by the constitution of the United States."'
Accordingly, such race consciousness highlighted MALDEF's reasons for wanting

140. See id. at 195-99.
141. Justice Brennan ordered Judge Doyle to instruct the Denver Public School Board "to desegregate the
entire [school] system 'root and branch."' Id. at 213 (quoting Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968)).
142. Memorandum from Mexican Am. Legal Def. & Educ. Fund Dirs. to Mexican Am. Legal Def. & Educ.
Fund Members 5, Criteria Suggested in Determining Litigation Priorities Spanish Surname Population (n.d.) (on
file with the Special Collections and University Archives, Stanford University).
143. Id.
144. See Complaint of Intervention, Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1,313 F. Supp. 61 (D. Colo.Feb. 22, 1974) (No.
C-1499) (on file with Archives, University of Colorado at Boulder Libraries).
145. See Motion to Intervene as Parties Plaintiffs at 3, Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1,313 F. Supp. 61 (D. Colo.
Jan. 4, 1974) (No. C-1499) (on file with Archives, University of Colorado at Boulder Libraries).
146. Preamble to Articles of Incorporation, La Raza Nat'l Inst. for Law and Justice (emphasis added) (on file
with the Special Collections and University Archives, Stanford University). In a subsequent resolution, the National
Institute on Law and Justice linked the fortunes of Mexican Americans with other "Latin" people as a distinct and
identifiable non-White group. National Institute on Law and Justice, Resolution 1 (on file with the Special
Collections and University Archives, Stanford University).
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to intervene in Keyes. According to the organization, the "issues presented to the
Court [had] been clearly Black dominated," and as a result, the federal judiciary
lacked sufficient exposure to the unique and diverse problems that confronted the
Chicano community. 147 Notably, MALDEF's petition to intervene in Keyes rejected
ethnic nomenclature that had long been used in the case (i.e., "Hispano") in favor
of a more explicitly racial discourse (i.e., "Chicano"). In its memorandum in support
of its motion to intervene, MALDEF argued that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision
in Keyes made it clear that "Chicanos cannot be counted as whites for any purpose"
in school desegregation litigation.148 And although the issues facing Blacks and
Chicana/os shared common questions of law and fact, MALDEF argued that
Chicana/os could not be considered another Black group. 149 Indeed, MALDEF
unambiguously indicated that a remedy appropriate for one non-White group of
students was not necessarily appropriate for another. 5 °
Once the court granted MALDEF's petition to join the litigation, MALDEF
created an integration policy to specifically address the needs of Denver's Chicana/o
students. The MALDEF policy, known as the "Cardefias Plan," proposed a
seemingly ethnic remedy but one that offered to reinforce the non-Whiteness of
Chicana/o students. 5 At the center of the Cardefias Plan rested a commitment to
bilingual and multicultural programs at every educational level.152 According to Dr.
Cardefias, such programs would positively and effectively foster a social identity,
which he hoped would help non-White students develop a meaningful sense of selfworth.'53 In a very important sense, the Plan
rejected one of the major premises of school desegregation litigation-the idea
that white students and their culture would lift minority students out of poverty,
indifference, and inferiority. Instead the Cardefilas Plan advocated that... Chicano
students would be best served by allowing them to learn about, identify with,

147. Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Intervene as Parties Plaintiff at 18, Keyes v. Sch. Dist.
No. 1, 313 F. Supp. 61 (D. Colo. Jan. 4, 1974) (No. C-1499) (on file with Archives, University of Colorado at
Boulder Libraries).
148. Id. at 13.
149. Id. at 18.
150. Id.; see also Romero, supra note 54, at 115-17.
151. The "Cardefias Plan" adopted the following as its rationale:
An instructional program developed for a white Anglo Saxon, English-speaking, middle class
school population cannot be and is not adequate for non-white, non-Anglo-Saxon, non-Englishspeaking, or non-middle class population.
To reverse the pattern of failure for non-typical children, it is necessary that the instructional
program and the characteristics of the learner be compatible.
In order to develop such an instructional program, it is necessary that incompatibilities be
identified and eliminated.
Jos6 A. Cardefias, An Education Plan for the Denver Public Schools 8 (Jan. 21, 1974) (on file with the Special
Collections and University Archives, Stanford University). For an analysis of the plan, see Romero, supra note 54,
at 116-18.
152. Cardefias, supra note 151, at 24. The bilingual approach was not just a desegregation approach advocated
by MALDEF but was a color conscious strategy pursued by a variety of Mexican American activists and
organizations. See, e.g., Sw. Intergroup Relations Council, Leadership Report, A Bilingual Approach: Education
for Understanding (on file with the Special Collections and University Archives, Stanford University). Critically,
bilingual education was conceptualized in color conscious terms as an alternative to schools that had been controlled
by Anglo-American curricula. See generally id.
153. Cardefias, supra note 151, at 15-16.
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emulate and celebrate their own [non-White] racial and cultural
and eventually
54
heroes.1
In turn, according to advocates of such programs, "the minority child and the Anglo
child" would have unprecedented opportunities for "enlarging their cultural universe
and perceiving each other as acceptable and equally good."' 51 In these terms, true
"integration" of the nation's schools required the introduction of curricula that
recognized Chicana/os as members of a legally distinct non-White group.
MALDEF's influence, at least on the trial court in Keyes, was profound. One
indicator of this influence is apparent in the language that Judge Doyle began to use
after the U.S. Supreme Court remanded Keyes. "No longer referring to Mexican
American students as 'Hispanos' in his decisions after 1973," Judge Doyle adopted
the term "Chicano" in identifying Denver's Spanish-surnamed community.156
Judge Doyle's attempt to provide a remedy that recognized distinct differences
in the experiences of Chicana/o students proved fleeting.157 Although guised in
ethnic terms, the Cardefias Plan proved incompatible with the color vision of
desegregation established in the years and decades since Brown. As the Tenth
Circuit held in reversing Judge Doyle's remedy, the "clear implication of arguments
in support of the court's adoption of the Cardenas [sic] Plan is that minority students
are entitled under the fourteenth amendment to an educational experience tailored
to their unique cultural and development needs. Although enlightened educational
theory may well demand as much, the Constitution does not."'' 58 In short, the Tenth
Circuit's opinion made it clear that courts
59 were to consider Chicana/os solely as an
indistinguishable "non-White" group. 1
The Tenth Circuit's rejection of the Cardefias Plan and the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision not to grant certiorari to review the rejection'60 represented the end of a
robust but highly problematic era in the racial construction and color positioning of
Latina/os in U.S. law. Represented most prominently in Keyes and Cisneros, the
articulation of Mexican Americans as a "readily identifiable, ethnic-minority
group"' 161 in each instance was subsequently constitutionalized in the U.S. Supreme
Court's decisions to combine Black and Latina/o students in relation to White
students in the "tri-ethnic" school district. Although Judge Doyle in Keyes and Judge
Seals in Cisneros suggested the extent to which Latina/o students were racialized
differently from Blacks by experiencing a different "origin" of discrimination, the
subsequent aggregation of Latina/os and Blacks by the U.S. Supreme Court as an

154. Romero, supra note 54, at 117 (footnote omitted). As Chief Justice Earl Warren noted in Brown, to
separate Black and White students "from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race
generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way
unlikely ever to be undone." Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
155. Henry T. Trueba, Bilingual-Bicultural Education for Chicanos in the Southwest, 5 COUNCIL ON
ANTHROPOLOGY & EDUC. Q. 8, 9 (1974) (emphasis added).
156. Romero, supra note 54, at 117.
157. Id. at 118-19 (describing the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' disapproval of Judge Doyle's "tri-ethnic
remedy").
158. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 521 F.2d 465,482 (10th Cir. 1975).
159. See Romero, supra note 54, at 119.
160. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 423 U.S. 1066 (1976).
161. Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Indep. Sch. Dist., 324 F. Supp. 599,604 (S.D. Tex. 1970) (footnote omitted).
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undifferentiated non-White group reinforced the legal in-betweeness of Latina/os
in constitutional understandings of race, color, and ethnicity.
As a matter of law, Latina/os appeared to be clearly on the non-White side of the
color line, yet their "ethnic" status as a "minority" severely limited the remedies
available to combat their segregation. In districts with "tri-ethnic" and "multiethnic" student bodies, a newly expansive color line constitutionalized in Keyes (i.e.,
the minority/non-minority line) ironically truncated the terms and conditions upon
which integration could be achieved. In this type of litigation, these terms would be
defined in reference to Whiteness and Blackness but never in reference to
Latinoness. In such a framework, the nation's school desegregation jurisprudence,
despite its attempt to apply to a "tri-ethnic" student body, fundamentally denied the
"different" origins and remedies of Latina/os' non-White racial construction.
Particularly, when it came to the issue of language discrimination, such denial
obscured altogether the centrality of race and color to the analysis.
In. NO S6LO PALABRAS PERO ACCIONES
In 1974, the Denver Commission on Community Relations compiled a reader on
the "Mexican and Spanish American.' 62 In this collection of materials, University
of Denver Professor Arthur Campa addressed the problematic correlation between
Latina/os, race, culture, and language in the United States. According to Professor
Campa, "[W]e have become accustomed to think of man as a member of a particular
race, with a corresponding language, and with a culture that represents his biological
and linguistic origin."' 163 In the post-World War H United States, Campa further
explained, this had a simplistic and overly mechanical application: "If a person is
blond he must be Anglo, if he is Anglo he can't be dark, if he is dark he is
Spanish[,]... if he speaks Spanish he eats Spanish food, he eats enchiladas, the latter
must be Spanish food, and ad infinitum or ad absurdum. ' ' 64 Although Campa's
subsequent analysis attempted to unravel this problematic correlation, he
nevertheless highlighted the understanding held by many of his contemporaries
about the centrality of language to the maintenance of the color line in U.S. culture
and life. 165 Particularly, in a United States that was being rapidly transformed by
migration from Latin America, Asia, and the Pacific, 66 and as the remedy of
bilingual education was contemplated as a legitimate response to the nation's
racially segregated schools, non-English language programs and language
discrimination highlighted precisely
67 how these issues could not be considered only
in terms of ethnic acculturation.

162.

SELECTED READING MATERIALS ON THE MEXICAN AND SPANISH AMERICAN (Maurice Velasquez ed.,

2d ed. 1971).
163. Arthur L. Campa, Language Barriersin InterculturalRelations, in SELECTED READING MATERIALS,
supranote 162, at 69, 69 (emphasis added).
164. Id. at 70. Interestingly, Campa's own understanding of racial differences in the United States noted the
absurdity of collapsing racial and ethnic distinctions around color. Thus, he stated that "French or Italian" must be

included in the language race logic because these "'Latin races' are dark!" Id.
165. See id. at 70-72.
166. See Rubdn G. Rumbaut, Origins and Destinies: Immigration to the United States Since World War I1,
9 SoC. F. 583, 600-03 (1994).
167. See supra notes 126-135 and accompanying text.
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This Part assesses the role that bilingual education litigation in the 1970s and
1980s played in the racial construction and color positioning of Latina/os in U.S.
law and jurisprudence. In contrast to the school desegregation cases, which were
based on the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection jurisprudence, many of the
Latino bilingual education cases were litigated under various and inter-related
provisions of federal law. 168 While such legislation was based on eradicating racial
and ethnic discrimination, it served as a poor proxy for Latina/os to the recently
articulated "tri-ethnic" color guarantees of constitutional jurisprudence. Indeed, in
related language rights cases, the racial construction and color positioning of
Latina/os lost all relevant and contextual meaning as both monolingual and bilingual
Spanish-speaking students came to be treated and understood as an ethnic "language
minority" group.
A. BilingualEducation Policy and Jurisprudencein the 1970s and the DeConflation of Race and Ethnicity
One year after the U.S. Supreme Court attempted to formulate principles of
national application with its "tri-ethnic" holding in Keyes, it considered for the first
time the role of bilingual education in its educational equality jurisprudence.16 9 Lau
v. Nichols was brought by a class of non-English speaking Chinese against the San
Francisco Unified School District for failing to provide any type of English
language instruction.17 ° To further complicate the situation, the School District had
been under a desegregation decree since 197 1,171 although the district court denied
a petition by the parents of Chinese students to intervene in the case.172 Partially as
a result of the 1971 decree to integrate its schools, some Chinese students were
receiving a bilingual education while others were not.'73 For the first time in its postBrown v. BoardofEducationeducational jurisprudence, the U.S. Supreme Court did
not consider whether such inequity was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Instead, the Court framed its analysis under Title VI
issue when
of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, thus avoiding the constitutional
174
the same end could theoretically be achieved by statutory means.

168. See infra notes 236-238 and accompanying text.
169. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
170. Id. at 564-65. For a thorough overview of the factual details of Lau, see STEPHANIE SAMMARTINO
MCPHERSON, LAU v. NICHoLs: BILINGUAL EDUCATION IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS (2000).

171. Johnson v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 339 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Cal. 1971), vacated, 500F.2d349 (9th Cir.
1974).
172. Johnson, 500 F.2d at 350. Importantly, "[t]he Chinese community opposed the busing aspect of the
integration order." Letter from Mario G. Obledo, President of the Executive Comm., Sw. Intergroup Relations
Council, Inc., to Vine Deloria, Executive Dir., Sw. Intergroup Relations Council, Inc. (Sept. 21, 1971) (on file with
the Special Collections and University Archives, Stanford University).
173. In Lau, the U.S. Supreme Court noted a report by the Human Rights Commission of San Francisco,
which demonstrated that
there were 3,457 Chinese students in the school system who spoke little or no English. The
document further showed 2,136 students enrolled in Chinese special instruction classes, but at
least 429 of the enrollees were not Chinese but were included for ethnic balance. Thus, as of
April 1973, no more than 1,707 of the 3,457 Chinese students needing special English
instruction were receiving it.
Lau, 414 U.S. at 564 n.1.
174. Id. at 571 & n.3 (Stewart, J., concurring). Notably, Justice Douglas's majority opinion initially
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As part of the federal government's response to discrimination in the post-World
War 11 United States, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 represented the first
of a series of federally sponsored initiatives to promote and achieve educational
equality. The Act stipulated that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance.'""' One year later, as part of President
Lyndon B. Johnson's War on Poverty, Congress enacted the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA) 176 in order to meet the needs of
educationally deprived children, especially through compensatory programs for the
poor. 17 Shortly thereafter, Senator Ralph Yarborough of Texas secured the passage
of the Bilingual Education Act of 1968.178 The Act, which became Title VII of the
ESEA, was largely spurred by evidence in Yarborough's own state of Texas where
"80 percent of Spanish-speaking children had to repeat first grade, and there were
twelve times as many Mexican Americans in first as in twelfth grade (the overall
ratio for Texans was three to one)."' 179 Yarborough and other proponents believed
that the Bilingual Education Act was passed exclusively for Latina/os.' 80 Although
language education programs had long emphasized the benefits of "deethnicization,"' 81 their emergence in national policy discourse specifically relating
Latina/os in the late 1960s indicated a subtle recognition of
to Spanish-speaking
82
status.
color
their
Precisely because the law provided for an expanded application of non-White
legal protection and remedies to other groups, federal bureaucrats, spearheaded by
the Department of Health and Welfare's (HEW) Office of Civil Rights (OCR), took

highlighted the color and not the ethnic dimensions of Title VI's protections by stating that it "excludes from
participation in federal financial assistance, recipients of aid which discriminate against racial groups." Id. at 565
(majority opinion) (emphasis added) (citing Lau v. Nichols, 483 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1973)).
175. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000).
176. Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-8962 (2000)).
177. See HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE UNCERTAIN TRIUMPH: FEDERAL EDUCATION POLICY IN THE KENNEDY
AND JOHNSON YEARS 70-71, 80-84 (1984).

178. Pub. L. No. 90-247, §§ 701-702, 81 Stat. 783, 816-19 (1968) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§
7401-7491 (2000)).
179. Gareth Davies, The GreatSociety After Johnson:The Case of BilingualEducation, 88 J.AM. HIST. 1405,
1407 (2002); see also SANDRA DEL VALLE, LANGUAGE RIGHTS AND THE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES: FINDING OUR
VOICES 226-28 (2003); GUADALUPE SAN MIGUEL, JR., CONTESTED POLICY: THE RISE AND FALL OF FEDERAL
BILINGUAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1960-2000, at 12-37 (2004); COLMAN BREZ STEIN, JR., SINK OR
SWIM: THE POLITICS OF BILINGUAL EDUCATION 20-32 (1986).
180. DIANE RAVITCH, THE TROUBLED CRUSADE: AMERICAN EDUCATION, 1945-1980, at 271-72 (1983). One

study noted that "[iun pushing for the BEA's passage, activists and legislators were, in large part, responding to the
criminalization of Spanish in public schools." Nirei Sekhon, Note, A Birthright Rearticulated: The Politics of
Bilingual Education, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1407, 1436 (1999); see also Rachel F. Moran, The Politics of Discretion:
FederalIntervention in Bilingual Education, 76 CAL. L. REv. 1249, 1258-63 (1988).
181. See Joshua A. Fishman, The Historicaland Social Contexts of an Inquiry into Language Maintenance
Efforts, in LANGUAGE LOYALTY IN THE UNITED STATES: THE MAINTENANCE AND PERPETUATION OF NON-ENGLISH
MOTHER TONGUES BY AMERICAN ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS GROUPS 21, 21 (Joshua A. Fishman et al. eds., 1966).

182. The debates regarding the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are revealing in this regard. In one
instance, Congressman Huddleston noted that "[t]he five races of man are white, black, brown, yellow, and red. I
think it is clear that the American Indian is a matter of race, not national origin." 110 CONG. REC. 2562 (1964)
(statement of Rep. Huddleston); see also Michael J. Frank, Justifiable Discrimination in the News and
EntertainmentIndustries: Does Title VII Need a Race or ColorBFOQ?, 35 U.S.F. L. REv. 473, 498 n. 181 (2001).
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an active role in extending the powers of the federal government to Latina/os in
racial terms. Established in 1965 to enforce Title VI, OCR employees focused their
initial energies on intensely fighting school desegregation in the American South.' 83
The culmination of their enforcement efforts in this regard were guidelines that the
HEW promulgated in 1968 that placed an affirmative duty upon school systems
receiving federal funding to assure "'that students of a particular race, color, or
national origin [were] not denied the opportunity to obtain the education generally
obtained by other students in the system."" 84 Shortly thereafter, OCR staffers
refocused and reprioritized the HEW's enforcement efforts as the agency became
increasingly conscious of discrimination directed at Latina/o students.185 Indeed, in
May of 1970, the HEW placed an affirmative obligation on school districts with
students of national origin-minority groups "'to rectify the language deficienc[ies]
1 86
in order to open' the instruction to students who had 'linguistic deficiencies.'
While in one sense this was a pragmatic response to the increasing political visibility
of Latina/o activists, 18 it also reflected the changed racial landscape of school
desegregation litigation as demonstrated by an emerging "tri-ethnic"
jurisprudence. 8 8 Importantly, this was a regulatory landscape that was increasingly
shaped by the nation's Latino community. As the OCR memorandum announced,
the regulations were formulated after "Title VI compliance review conducted in
school districts with large Spanish-surnamed student populations.. .revealed a
number of common practices which have the effect
of denying equality of
189
educational opportunity to Spanish-surnamed pupils.'
In a very important sense, the 1970 HEW regulation anticipated the attempt in
Keyes to develop principles of "national application" by expanding its regulatory
183. See Davies, supranote 179, at 1416.
184. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 566-67 (1974) (quoting Policies on Elementary and Secondary School
Compliance with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 33 Fed. Reg. 4955, 4956 (Mar. 23, 1968)).
185. See Davies, supra note 179, at 1416-19.
186. Lau, 414 U.S. at 567 (quoting Identification of Discrimination and Denial of Services on the Basis of
National Origin, 35 Fed. Reg. 11,595, 11,595 (July 18, 1970)).
187. Gareth Davies notes the increasing visibility and lobbying efforts of Latina/os in many aspects of the
federal government. See Davies, supranote 179, at 1410-15. Such visibility, Davies argues, was not the result of
Latino grass-roots efforts, but that "federal policy makers and foundation executives sometimes seemed to be
creating, rather than responding to, constituency demand." Id. at 1418. I would suggest that Davies reading of
history is too narrow and the analysis is made more complex by the intensity of Latino lobbying efforts at the state
and national level since World War II. See generally JULE LEININGER PYCIOR, LBJ AND MEXICAN AMERICANS: THE
PARADOX OF POWER 111-82 (1997) (documenting the various ways that Mexican Americans, not only in Texas
but throughout the Southwest, actively attempted to achieve political influence at the local, state, and national
levels).
188. See supra Part II.A-B; see also Diana v. Bd. of Educ., No. C-70-37 (N.D. Cal. settled 1973) (discussing
an IQ test administered in English to Spanish-speaking children that was used to place Latina/o students in classes
for the mentally disabled), cited in Davies, supranote 179, at 1417.
189. Identification of Discrimination, 35 Fed. Reg. at 11,595. The HEW guidelines, moreover, were given
their substance as a result of the agency's close collaboration with Latina/o activists. Martin Gerry, the senior staffer
who outlined detailed enforcement instructions for the HEW regulation, "emphasized that they had been drawn up
in consultation with 'outstanding Mexican-American and Puerto Rican educators, psychologists, and community
and civil rights leaders."' Davies, supra note 179, at 1422-23 (quoting LEON PANE'rTA, BRING Us TOGETHER
174-75 (1971)). The influence of Latina/o activists would further be solidified on "[a] panel created to advise
noncompliant [school] districts [that was] comprised [of] '75 Mexican American, Puerto Rican, and Native
American educators, psychologists, and community leaders.' As for the future,.. .HEW would 'continue to place
primary reliance on the policy developmental capabilities' of those [Latina/o] individuals." Id. at 1423 (quoting
PANETrA, supra, at 193-94, 274).
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reach to protect previously neglected groups. Indeed, as HEW bureaucrats looked
beyond the South to enforce Title VI, they discovered that the nature of inequality
was fundamentally different. Particularly when it came to Spanish-surnamed
individuals, language-as Latina/o activists had long maintained-served as a
barometer of the different origins of discriminatory color treatment in U.S.
society. 9 0 As one MALDEF proposal succinctly stated, "Mexican-Americans also
have some unique problems shared by few of the other minorities. Of these, the
language barrier is perhaps most difficult."' 9' Though some students of the Act
maintain that "[n]othing in the legislative history of the 1964 debate suggests that
supporters of the Civil Rights Act anticipated so broad a construction,"'' 92 Title VI
specifically prohibited discrimination based upon imprecise and poorly articulated
distinctions of race, color, and national origin status. 193 Significantly, in the racially
charged political arena of the late 1960s, the HEW regulation, in contrast to Keyes,
conceptualized national origin (i.e., ethnic) discrimination as essentially different
from race and color discrimination.' 94 In other words, the regulation suggested that
language discrimination directed at Spanish-surnamed students was not only
evidence of a different origin of discrimination than that which confronted Black

190. See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1,413 U.S. 189, 197-98 (1973).
191. ACLU Found. of N. Cal., Inc. & Mexican Am. Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, A Project for the Defense of
the Constitutional Rights of Mexican-Americans Residing in the Rural Areas of Northern California 2 (1974) (on
file with the Special Collections and University Archives, Stanford University).
192. Davies, supra note 179, at 1420.
193. The congressional debates regarding the Civil Rights Act reveal how imprecisely legislators understood
and conceptualized the lines between race, color, and national origin. For example, in a discussion regarding the
addition of "national origin" as a bona fide occupational qualification, the following exchange occurred:
Mr. Dowdy:.. .Do I understand that it will be perfectly all right for a person advertising for
employees to express a preference for a white person?
Roosevelt: No. "National origin" has nothing to do with the color of one's pigment.
Mr. Rodino: It goes to the question of what is a bona fide occupational qualification. There
may be some instances where a person of a certain national origin may be specifically required
to meet the qualifications of a particular job.
Mr. Dowdy: Use the words "Anglo-Saxon."
Mr. Rodino: No, of course not. The gentleman thoroughly understands that that is not
included under a definition of "national origin."
Mr. Dowdy: No, I do not understand it. When you say "national origin" that is a national
origin is it not?
Mr. Rodino: "National origin" does not apply to color or race.
Mr. Dowdy: I said "Anglo-Saxon."
Mr. Rodino: What "national origin" is Anglo-Saxon?
Mr. Dowdy: It is English.
Mr. Roosevelt: May I just make very clear that "national origin" means national. It means
the country from which you or your forebears came from. You may come from Poland,
Czechoslovakia, England, France, or any other country. It has nothing to do with broad terms
such as the gentleman has referred to.
Mr. Dent: National origin, of course has nothing to do with color, religion, or the race of an
individual. A man may have migrated here from Great Britain and still be a colored person. I
refer the gentleman to the book just put out by the Census Bureau which gives data on origin and
yet covers all races only by country of origin.
110 CONG. REc. 2549 (1964).
194. See Identification of Discrimination, 35 Fed. Reg. at 11,595.
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students 9 ' but that it also had very different effects and required a different remedy
in integrating the nation's schools.' 96
By focusing on the ethnic origin of the discriminatory treatment, the HEW
memorandum implicitly obscured the role that language discrimination (regardless
of proficiency) played not only in the racialization of Latina/os but also in their
social and legal placement on the non-White side of the color line. Indeed, the
identification of Spanish-surnamed students as a national origin group had long been
used to deny Latina/o students their legal right to make a non-White color claim.
According to Clare Sheridan, courts in the early twentieth century consistently
considered Mexican Americans to be a "nationality" group that was subject to a
lower degree of legal protection. 97 Following this line of reasoning, "'nationality
groups' did not carry the same constitutional meaning as racial groups did, and
because 'Mexicans' were a nationality group, the equal protection clause did not
apply to them."' 198 This theory was especially powerful in Texas in the early
twentieth century where courts consistently allowed the segregation of Mexican
Americans from "other white races"' 99 as a result of ostensibly ethnic "migrant work
patterns, English-language deficiencies, and the need to 'Americanize' Mexican
students. '' 200 Although the 1970 HEW regulation was intended to remedy such
inequities and patterns of discrimination, it had the effect of taking the issues of
racialization and the color line out of the analysis. Indeed, in a 1972 Title VI
compliance review of the New York public school system, the HEW inquired into
the "services being provided to Italian, Greek and French speaking minorities as
well as Spanish and Asian language speaking minority groups. '20 ' The fact that the
issue of language and equality of educational equity in the HEW directive was
framed exclusively in ethnic terms would prove especially troublesome for Latina/o
litigants who themselves could not consistently articulate the color dimensions of
the issue.
Amici briefs submitted to the U.S. Supreme Court in the Lau litigation in 1972
reveal the tortured and problematic de-conflation of ethnicity from race and color
in the nation's emerging "tri-ethnic" equality of educational opportunity
jurisprudence. Specifically, the briefs of the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and
Education Fund (PRLDEF)2 2 and the collective efforts of MALDEF, the American
G.I. Forum, the League of United Latin American Citizens, and the Association of
195. The OCR memorandum compared the experience of Spanish-surnamed students "with respect to
disadvantaged pupils from other national origin-minority groups, for example; Chinese or Portuguese." Id.
196. As Professor Davies noted, "Although the May 1970 memorandum made no specific reference to
bilingual education, it was the most obvious remedy." Davies, supranote 179, at 1421.
197. Sheridan, supra note 3, at 120.
198. Id.
199. See id. at 120-21 (discussing Mexican Americans and the jury selection process).
200. Romero, supra note 54, at 101; see also GILBERT G. GONZALEZ, CHCANO EDUCATION IN THE ERA OF

SEGREGATION 118-20 (1990); Kristi L. Bowman, Note, The New Face of School Desegregation, 50 DUKE L.J.
1751, 1772 (2001).
201. Martin Gerry, Acting Dir., Office for Civil Rights of the Dep't of Health, Educ., & Welfare, Address
Before a Federal Legislative Committee 10 (Mar. 12, 1974) (transcript available in the Special Collections and
Archives, Stanford University).
202. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Puerto Rican Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc., in Support of
Petitioners, Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (No. 72-6520). For a discussion of the early history of the
PRLDEF, see William B. Glaberson, PuertoRican Legal Fund: 10 Years Old and Growing, 188 N.Y.L.J. 1(1982).
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American Educators (MALDEF brief) 20 3 underscore the inconsistent manner in
which Latina/os have highlighted their "national origin" ethnic status while at the
same time speaking in clearly color-conscious terms.
The PRLDEF participation in Lau emphasized the ethnic dimensions of the
litigation. 204 The PRLDEF originally attempted to shape the law in this regard by
filing its own lawsuit on behalf of 182,000 Puerto Rican and other Spanish-speaking
children against the New York City public school system for its denial of equal
educational opportunities. 25' This lawsuit, accordingly, informed the PRLDEF's
analysis as an amici to Lau. In its brief, the PRLDEF argued that "the unequal
treatment to which [Spanish-speaking children] are subjected is based on language,
which is inextricably a part of their ethnicity and national origin. ' '206 Implicitly
utilizing the "tri-ethnic" framework of Keyes, the PRLDEF explained the differential
treatment by comparing Spanish-speaking Puerto Rican students to "Anglo
American or Black youngsters. ' 207 The PRLDEF collapsed racial and color
differences into an ethnic difference by asserting that the "threshold [constitutional]
question" was "whether children of one ethnic or national origin group, who do not
understand the language of instruction, receive an equal educational opportunity as
compared to children of another ethnic or national origin group who do understand
that language."2 °8 Importantly, the Puerto Rican experience highlighted the
limitations of the national origin category as applied to Latina/os and other groups
in this time period. Although Puerto Ricans have been citizens of the United States
since 1917, the language differences between the dominant English-speaking culture
in the United States and Spanish-speaking Puerto Ricans has produced "a
racialization" of the Puerto Rican people as both non-White and non-Black
foreigners incapable of assimilation into the U.S. mainstream. 209 In this sense,
language discrimination has constituted a critical but by no means determinative part
of the process of racialization for Latina/os.
This point was further refined in the MALDEF brief in Lau. According to
MALDEF,
[the] denial of an equal educational opportunity presently taking place in the
Chinese community in San Francisco is but a microcosm of the situation facing
Spanish-speaking communities in the United States today. From towns as

203. Brief of Amici Curiae Mexican American Legal Defense & Educational Fund et al., Lau v. Nichols, 414
U.S. 563 (1974) (No. 72-6520).
204. Brief of Puerto Rican Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc., supra note 202, at 3.
205. Aspira of N.Y., Inc. v. Bd. of Educ., 58 F.R.D. 62, 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); see also Brief of Puerto Rican
Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc., supra note 202, at 2-3.
206. Brief of Puerto Rican Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc., supra note 202, at 3.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 4 (emphasis added). This point is later reemphasized in the PRLDEF brief in relation to the Lau
litigation: "By failing to take reasonable steps to teach petitioners English, respondents have erected a classification
between school children who receive instruction in a language they understand and those who do not, and such
classification is based upon the prime national origin characteristic of Asian-Americans-their language." Id. at 9.
209. M.ALAVET, supranote 35, at 22. This point has also been emphasized regarding other "non-Black" racial
minorities such as Asian Americans, Latina/os, and Arab Americans. See Neil Gotunda, Asian American Rights and
the "Miss Saigon Syndrome, " in ASIAN AMERICANS AND THE SUPREME COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1087,

1096 (Hyung-chan Kim ed., 1992); Daryl J. Maeda, Black Panthers, Red Guards, and Chinamen: Constructing
Asian American Identity Through Performing Blackness, 1969-1972, 57 AM. Q. 1079, 1081 (2005).
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diverse as Laredo, Texas to New York City, Spanish surnamed children come
to school with.. .a cultural heritage entirely different than that of Anglo
Americans.21 °
MALDEF argued that this problem has persisted since the first Mexican immigrants
began to work in mining, railroads, and "other such laboring work" at the end of the
nineteenth century. 2 ' Critically, MALDEF argued that ethnic difference alone, as
expressed by language, was insufficient to explain the century-long exclusion of
Latina/os from the American "melting pot" by stating that, "[i]f this large mass of
people had become integrated into American society as ethnic groups from Europe
21 2
had, then the Spanish language, in all likelihood, would not have flourished.
Although continuing waves of immigration from Mexico explained this outcome,
most determinative in MALDEF's analysis was the fact that "Mexican Americans
have suffered the same type of social, economic and political discrimination as the
black American. ' 213 The color line "forced on [Latina/os] by the dominant Anglo
society" created the conditions for the formation of racialized and insular non-White
urban communities that "contributed significantly to this group clinging to its
cultural heritage to an extent greater than other ethnic groups. 2 4
Not coincidently, MALDEF minimized any similarity between Latina/os and the
Chinese students in Lau while embracing the Latino community's Blackness.2 5
Although this was seemingly in opposition to the position taken by MALDEF in the
Keyes litigation, it demonstrated an explicit and increasing "interdependence of
racial formations" 216 among communities that had long been on the non-White side
of the color line.21 7 Comparisons to Blackness thus allowed the Latino amici in
Lau-particularly those represented by the PRLDEF and MALDEF-to articulate
the ways in which language contributed to a unique but constitutionally
comprehensible form of color oppression.
The fact that Lau, which focused exclusively on Chinese-speaking people, would
eventually settle similar claims involving Spanish-speaking people in the nation's
lower courts,2 ' 8 however, undermined this connection between language, color, and
Latina/os. Critically important in this regard was an increasingly popular association
of Asian Americans, namely Japanese and Chinese Americans, as "model" ethnic
minority groups that had effectively assimilated into the U.S. mainstream. As
Professor Daryl Maeda points out, such claims could not have been made prior to
the 1960s:
From the beginning of large-scale migrations to the United States in the mid1800s through the beginning of World War H, Asians faced legal barriers to

210. Brief of Mexican American Legal Defense & Education Fund et al., supra note 203, at 5.
211. Seeid. at7.
212. Id. at 9.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 12.
215. See id. at 9-10.
216. See Maeda, supra note 209, at 1081.
217. See Brief of Mexican American Legal Defense & Education Fund et al., supra note 203, at 9-10.
218. See, e.g., Guadalupe Org., Inc. v. Tempe Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 3, 587 F.2d 1022, 1029 (9th Cir.
1978); Sema v. Portales Mun. Sch. Bd., 499 F.2d 1147, 1153 (10th Cir. 1974).
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assimilation in the form of immigration restrictions, bars to naturalization, and
antimiscegenation laws. In addition, the Yellow Peril discourse positioned
Asians as inherently inassimilable perpetual foreigners.219

The political imperatives of the Cold War world, however, forced the United
States-at least at a national level-to reevaluate its racial domestic and foreign
relations policy and jurisprudence.220
Liberalized naturalization and immigration laws, as well as an increasingly robust
equal protection discourse, "suggested the possibility of Asian American
assimilation ' 22' in European ethnic terms.222 Indeed, this was an image, as Professor
Maeda discusses, that was nationalized in 1966 with two publications in the New
York Times Magazine223 and in U.S. News and World Report.2 24 According to
Professor Maeda, "Both articles compared Asian Americans favorably to blacks,
arguing that unlike 'Negroes,' Asian Americans had overcome racial discrimination
and were on the verge of achieving assimilation. '225 In contrast, a very different
image of assimilability, or lack thereof, emerged regarding the Latino population in
popular discourse. Nationally read publications such as U.S. News and World Report
increasingly highlighted the threat that Latina/os posed to U.S. culture and life.226
Although such magazine articles framed the problem almost exclusively as one of
immigration, they very powerfully reinforced the long-standing assumption of
Latina/os' inability to assimilate in the United States.227
Precisely because the racialization of Asians at this moment was fundamentally
different than that of Latina/os, Lau was a troubling case for Latina/os to support.
In a letter to MALDEF, one attorney noted: "I am now more certain than before, that
this is the wrong case to go to the Supreme Court first. A case involving the vast

219. Maeda, supra note 209, at 1083; see also ROGER DANIELS, THE POLITICS OF PREJUDICE: THE ANTIJAPANESE MOVEMENT IN CALIFORNIA AND THE STRUGGLE FOR JAPANESE EXCLUSION 65-78 (1962); ROBERT G.

LEE, ORIENTALS: ASIAN AMERICANS IN POPULAR CULTURE 106-44 (1999).

220. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARv. L. REV. 518, 524 (1980) (arguing that Brown should be understood in terms of its value to
policy makers who saw the domestic and foreign policy benefits of abandoning segregation); see also MARY L.
DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 79-115 (2000).

221. Maeda, supra note 209, at 1083.
222. As others have demonstrated, such association to European assimilation has its discursive and legal
limits. See, e.g., Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsiderin American Law and Culture:Can Free
Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1258, 1270-73 (1992); John M. Kang,
Deconstructing the Ideology of White Aesthetics, 2 MICH. J. RACE & L. 283, 347-53 (1997).
223. Maeda, supranote 209, at 1083 (citing William Petersen, Success Story, Japanese-AmericanStyle, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 9, 1966 (Magazine)).
224. Id. (citing Success Story of One Minority Group in the U.S., U.S. NEWS& WORLD REP., Dec. 26, 1966).
225. Id.
226. E.g., How Millions of Illegal Aliens Sneak into U.S., U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 22, 1974, at 27;
"Invasion " by IllegalAliens and the ProblemsThey Create,U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 23, 1973, at 32; Surge
of Illegal ImmigrantsAcross American Borders, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 17, 1972, at 32; Why "Wetbacks"
Are So Hard to Control,U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 18, 1971, at 50.
227. One study on similar types of newspaper articles and public discourse documented how metaphors used
to describe Latino immigrants (e.g., "sneak," "invade," "surge," and "hard to control") highlight precisely the
media's power to render Latinalo migrants as fundamentally incapable of joining the nation's body politic. OTTO
SANTA ANA, BROWN TIDE RISING: METAPHORS OF LATINO IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN PUBLIC DISCOURSE

257-94 (2002). The policy dimensions of such public opinion is explored in DAVID G. GUTtRREZ, WALLS AND
MIRRORS: MEXICAN AMERICANS, MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS, AND THE POLITICS OF ETHNICITY 188-89 (1995)
(highlighting concerns that Mexican immigrants were "stealing jobs" from Americans).
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majority of the 5,000,000 children involved-Spanish speaking children-should
go up first. '228 Instead, Lau, which focused on the children of recent Chinese
immigrants, converged
seamlessly with the "model minority myth, 229 the larger
"ethnicity paradigm, '230 and the legal implications of the 1970 HEW National
Origin guidelines 23' to make the racialized origins of language
discrimination-articulated by Latino groups such as MALDEF-irrelevant to the
legal analysis. This, in turn, forged an equality jurisprudence that effectively severed
color considerations from ethnic discrimination. Indeed, MALDEF General Counsel
and President Vilma Martinez was troubled by an opinion that would "substitute[]
a constitutional mandate for bilingual education for a statutory one" 232 that would
largely impact three to five million students, most of whom were Spanish-speaking
and of Mexican or Puerto Rican descent.233 For these reasons, Martinez 234
warned,
"'Lau is going to be as hard to enforce as Brown v. Board of Education.' ,
The implication that language discrimination was temporary and even limited in
effect made Lau's implementation even more difficult. Justice Blackmun's
concurrence makes this point clear:
Against the possibility that the Court's judgment may be interpreted too broadly,
I stress the fact that the children with whom we are concerned here number
about 1,800.... We may only guess as to why they have had no exposure to
English in their preschool years. Earlier generations of American ethnic groups
have overcome the language barrier by earnest parental endeavor or by the hard
fact of being pushed out of the family or community nest and into the realities
of broader experience.235
Although Justice Blackmun's concurrence suggested that there may be a categorical
difference between the assimilation of "earlier generations of American ethnic
groups" and the current group of non-English-speaking students, he nevertheless
highlighted the limited dimensions of the Lau decision, along with its subsequent
codification in the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974,236 as well as the
dramatic expansion of bilingual education enforcement, 23 7 funding, and programs

228. Letter from Sanford Jay Rosen to Alan Exelrod, Mexican Am. Legal Def. & Educ. Fund (Apr. 10, 1973)
(on file with the Special Collections and University Archives, Stanford University).
229. See Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses ofRace, 118 HARv. L. REv. 1489, 1532 & n.218 (2005); see also supra
notes 218-225 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 126-128 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 194-196 and accompanying text.
232. Martinez, supra note 64, at 8.
233. Linda Mathews, Lau Ruling Sparks New Litigation, RACE REL. REP., Sept. 1974, at 38, 38; see also
Memorandum from Carlos M. Alcala, Attorney, Mexican Am. Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Beatriz Rivera, Law Clerk,
Mexican Am. Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, and Berta R. Thayer, Law Clerk, Mexican Am. Legal Def. & Educ. Fund
to Lau Conference Participants 2-5 (Mar. 1, 1974) (on file with the Special Collections and University Archives,
Stanford University).
234. Mathews, supra note 233, at 38 (quoting Interview with Vilma S. Martinez, President & Gen. Counsel,
Mexican Am. Legal Def. & Educ. Fund).
235. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 571-72 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
236. In the wake of the Lau decision, Congress enacted legislation that required every school district to "take
appropriate action to overcome language barriers that impede equal participation by its students in its instructional
programs." Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 204(f), 88 Stat. 484, 515 (codified
at 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f) (2000)).
237. The HEW issued informal guidelines that came to be known as the "Lau Remedies." Beatrice F. Birman
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at both the federal level and the state level. 238 The impact of such ethnic statutory
remedies on the constitutional rights of Latina/o students was profound. For
example, the Ninth Circuit in a 1978 case signaled its legal priorities in its "triethnic" jurisprudence where "[t]here exists no constitutional duty imposed by the
Equal Protection Clause to provide bilingual-bicultural education.,,239 Two years
later, the Sixth Circuit's 1980 decision in Bradley v. Milliken made evident the
preference in those "tri-ethnic" school systems divided by color: "[W]hen the choice
is between maintaining optimal conditions in a bilingual educational program [for
Spanish speakers] and desegregating all-black schools, desegregation must
prevail. '24" As Latina/os soon discovered in subsequent language rights cases, their
national origin language status in the law proved not only a poor proxy to their color
positioning in the nation's public schools but also provided a means in the 1980s to
further position them beyond the nation's color line.
B. English Only, Post-EthnicAmerican Color Dreams, and MultiracialRealities
in the 1980s
In 1977, Professor Gary Orfield, a long-time activist for equality of educational
opportunity, testified before Congress about the role of bilingual education in
creating more just and equal schools. 24' Repeating a theme that would soon become
commonplace, Professor Orfield lamented the federal government's implementation
of bilingual education:
There is nothing in the research to suggest that children can effectively learn
English without continuous interaction with ther [sic] children who are native
English speakers, yet the Federal money has supported programs with only about
one-tenth Anglos in the average class. In a society where Spanish-surname
children are now more segregated than blacks.. .and where the Supreme Court
has found such segregation unconstitutional, a program that tends to increase
separation, raises serious questions.242
Like the "tri-ethnic" school desegregation cases, bilingual education--on its
own-increasingly came to be understood not only to be inconsistent with but also
to be at complete odds with the color vision of desegregation (and assimilation)
established in the decades since Brown. As the language in Professor Orfield's
testimony indicates, it was a legal and political regime that racialized Latina/os and
& Alan L. Ginsburg, Introduction: Addressing the Needs of Language-Minority Children, in BILINGUAL
EDUCATION: A REAPPRAISAL OF FEDERAL POLICY, at ix, xii (Keith A. Baker & Adriana A. de Kanter eds., 1983).

These guidelines required elementary schools to teach the English language to non-English-speaking students and
to provide native language instruction in other classes until the students achieved a level of proficiency sufficient
to enter an English-speaking classroom. OFFICE FOR CIvIL RIGHTS OF THE DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE,
TASK-FORCE FINDINGS SPECIFYING REMEDIES AvAILABLE FOR ELIMINATING PAST EDUCATIONAL PRACrICES RULED
UNLAWFUL UNDER L4U v. NcHOLS (1975), reprinted in BILINGUAL EDUCATION, supra,app. b at 213-21.

238. E.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1703(0 (1982); Bilingual-Bicultural Education Act of 1976, CAL. EDUC. CODE §§
52161, 52163(a) (2006).
239. Guadalupe Org., Inc. v. Tempe Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 3, 587 F.2d 1022, 1027 (9th Cir. 1978).
240. Bradley v. Milliken, 620 F.2d 1143, 1154 (6th Cir. 1980).
241. Bilingual Education: Hearing on H.R. 15 Before the Subcomm. on Elementary, Secondary, and
Vocational Educ. of the H. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 95th Cong. 335-36 (1977) (statement of Gary Orfield,
Department of Political Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign).
242. Id. at 336 (emphasis added).
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the ethnic trait of language in color-conscious terms.243 By maintaining an
educational system that prevented Latina/os from becoming White (through
acquiring English proficiency), Professor Orfield suggested that the state had a role
in creating the conditions that made Latina/os worse off than Blacks. 2"
not racial
Consequently, many believed that such "ethnic" policies, and
245
discrimination, contributed directly to the segregation of Latina/os.
Beginning with the passage of an English-only law in Virginia in 198 1,2 state
governments and the federal legislature contemplated, for the first time since the
1920s, comprehensive legal regimes designed to stigmatize non-English speakers.247
Indeed, in the same year that Virginia passed its English-only law, California
Senator Samuel Ichiye Hayakawa introduced the English Language Amendment in
Congress.248 During the rest of the decade, fourteen more states adopted Englishonly statutes or constitutional amendments.24 9 In many cases, contemporaries saw
such initiatives as a way to challenge bilingual educational programs.25 ° Critically,
much as in the 1920s,"' concerns regarding "immigration" animated much of the
redeployed racialized discourse.252

243. See id.
244. See id.
245. See infra notes 257-259 and accompanying text.
246. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 22.1-212.1 (2005).
247. In 1920, Nebraska "amended its constitution to declare English its official language." Note, "Official
English": Federal Limits on Efforts to Curtail Bilingual Services in the States, 100 HARv. L. REV. 1345, 1346 n.7
(1987) (citing NEB. CONST. art. I, § 27). "In 1923, Illinois declared 'American' its official language, substituting
'English' in 1969." Id. (citing ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1, para. 3005 (Smith-Hurd 1980)); see also Wayne A. Santoro,
Conventional Politics Takes Center Stage: The Latino Struggle Against English-Only Laws, 77 Soc. FORCEs 887,
890-91 (1999); Joseph Leibowicz, Current Topics in Law and Policy, The Proposed English Language Amendment:
Shield or Sword?, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 519, 541-42 (1985).
248. S.J. Res. 72, 97th Cong., 127 CONG. REc. 7444 (1981). It is not insignificant for this analysis that
Senator Hayakawa was of Japanese descent and thus represents a personification of the very different politics of
racialization between Asians and Latinos that surfaced in the Lau litigation. See supra notes 215-234 and
accompanying discussion.
249. Santoro, supra note 247, at 890-91 (listing Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida,
Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Carolina, and Tennessee). Such
efforts continued in the 1990s. Id. at 891 (stating that the state legislatures of Montana, New Hampshire, South
Dakota, and Wyoming adopted English-only statutes in the 1990s).
250. Note, supra note 247, at 1346-47; Leibowicz, supra note 247, at 524.
251. See Leibowicz, supra note 247, at 533-39; see also GERSTLE, supra note 23, at 104-14 (discussing the
relationship between science and racialized restrictions that emerged in federal immigration law in the 1920s).
According to Gerstle,
We do not usually think of the 1920s, the easygoing Jazz Age, as a time when the racialized
character of the American nation intensified, reinforcing barriers separating blacks and Asians
from whites, eastern and southern Europeans from "Nordics," and immigrants from natives. Yet
these developments were central to the age.
GERSTLE, supra note 23, at 114.

252. Initially, such concerns were couched in nationalistic terms. For example, Representative Jim Wright,
in a debate regarding a proposed requirement to force immigrants seeking citizenship to study English, argued that
"language is the common thread that ties us all together." 130 CONG. REC. 17,050 (1984) (statement of Rep.
Wright). The Senate Judiciary Committee, in a statement supporting a declaration in the Immigration Reform Act
that English is the official language of the United States, argued that "if language and cultural separatism rise above
a certain level, the unity and political stability of the nation will-in time--be seriously diminished." S. REP. No.
98-62, at 7 (1983); see also Bill Ong Hing, Beyond the Rhetoric ofAssimilation and Cultural Pluralism: Addressing
the Tension of Separatism and Conflict in an Immigration-Driven Multiracial Society, 81 CAL. L. REV. 863, 870-75
(1993).
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At the same time, multicultural education again emerged as a major pedagogical
mission in the nation's educational institutions. 253 Once a prominent part of the
learning landscape in the years immediately following Brown v. Board of
Education,2 54 multicultural education rested on the premise that, "if persons are to
understand each other, they must know about one another. '' 255 As a result,
multicultural education models attempted to address this knowledge gap by
"providing information about various cultures, their histories, their customs, their
languages, and their traditions. 25 6 This pedagogical philosophy, however, had some
extremely vehement critics. Some commentators have noted the very real
sociological limitations of the multicultural ethnic model for understanding
differences, 257 some have made it a prominent pariah of the so-called "culture
wars," 258 and others have indicated their preference for a "post-ethnic" U.S. nation
state.2 11 Indeed, Professor David Hollinger, the progenitor of the "post-ethnic"
vision, was himself an acute observer of the collapse of ethnic, racial, and color
categories in contemporary U.S. culture and life. 260 Hollinger nevertheless struggled
to reconcile a proper role for the maintenance of difference in the nation's future:
"Insofar as there is an ideal nation from a postethnic point of view, it is a democratic
state defined by a civic principle of nationality in the hands of an ethno-racially
diverse population and possessed of a national ethos of its own. 26'
Such initiatives, criticisms, and calls for a "post-ethnic" United States meshed
well with a larger "tri-ethnic" jurisprudence that, in its application, was erecting
increasingly rigid lines between permissible ethnic categorization as opposed to

253. A. Reynaldo Contreras & Leonard A. Valverde, The Impact of Brown on the Educationof Latinos, 63
J. NEGRO EDUC. 470, 477 (1994).
254. See Romero, supra note 54, 77-80 (analyzing the role of cultural pluralism on primary school pedagogy
during the 1950s).
255. Contreras & Valverde, supra note 253, at 477.
256. Id.
257. See generally MARY C. WATERS, ETHNIC OPTIONS: CHOOSING IDENTrrIES IN AMERICA (1990). In her
very provocative study, Waters assessed the voluntary nature of ethnic identity for White ethnics in the United
States in relation to a persistent notion that ethnicity is an immutable characteristic. Id. Accordingly, European
ethnics maintained that there was a formal "equivalence between the African-American and say, Polish-American
heritages," thus negating very real differences in the construction and voluntary nature of non-European immigrants
in choosing their ethnicity. Id. at 167.
258. Literature regarding the intense discord and promise provoked by multicultural education is extensive.
For a representative sampling, see MARY DILG, RACE AND CULTURE INTHE CLASSROOM: TEACHING AND LEARNING
THROUGH MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION 104-06 (1999); THOMAS J. LA BELLE & CHRISTOPHER R. WARD,
MULTICULTURALISM AND EDUCATION: DIVERSITY AND ITS IMPACT ON SCHOOLS AND SOCIETY 29-47 (1994)

(describing debates taking place between and within dominate and subordinate groups about multicultural
education); James A. Banks, The Canon Debate, Knowledge Construction, and MulticulturalEducation,22 EDUC.
RESEARCHER 4, 4-5 (1993) (discussing the very different interpretations about what aspects of ethnic and cultural
diversity should be taught in schools); Christine E. Sleeter & Carl A. Grant, An Analysis ofMulticultural Education
in the United States, 57 HARv. EDUC. L. REV. 421, 436-39 (1987) (assessing the inconsistent ways that the term
"multicultural education" is interpreted and implemented).
259. E.g., DAVID A. HOLLINGER, POSTETHNIC AMERICA: BEYOND MULTICULTURALISM 169-72 (1995). Tied
to such calls for a "post-ethnic" United States were arguments to dramatically constrain non-European (i.e., nonWhite) immigration to the United States. See, e.g., Peter Brimelow, Time to Rethink Immigration? The Decline of
the AmericanizationofImmigrants, NAT'L REV., June 22, 1992, at 30 (arguing against current immigration patterns
from Asia and Latin America as a direct threat to the nation's European racial "stock").
260. See HOLLINGER, supra note 259, at 19-61. Hollinger describes this phenomenon as the "Ethno-racial
Pentagon." Id. at 19.
261. Id. at 132 (emphasis added).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

impermissible racial discrimination. This was most noticeable in a series of language
discrimination cases litigated by Spanish-speaking people in the 1980s regarding
employment, voting and related First Amendment cases, and jury selection.2 62 These
Latina/o litigants found their "ethnic minority status," much like in the education
cases, 26 3 of little consistent conceptual or analytical value. Instead, these cases
summarily rejected the observation in Keyes that Latina/os, though having unique
origins, suffered the effects of non-White discrimination. Entrenched firmly in the
jurisprudence as members of a national origin ethnic group, Latina/o litigants were
beyond color recognition in a legal system that tenaciously clung to a bi-racial
vision of equity and justice despite the multi-racial transformation of the nation.
No case demonstrates this ambivalence more vividly than the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Hernandez v. New York in 1991. 264 When a New York State
criminal prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to reject the only two Latina/os
as potential jurors in the criminal proceeding of Dionisio Hernandez,265 it brought
into focus the discursive messiness of the nation's "tri-ethnic" jurisprudence for
Latina/os. At issue in the case were the bilingual abilities of the rejected Latino
jurors. According to the prosecutor,
my reason for rejecting the-these two jurors-I'm not certain as to whether
they're Hispanics. I didn't notice how many Hispanics had been called to the
feel very uncertain that they
panel, but my reason for rejecting these two is I 266
would be able to listen and follow the interpreter.
Both the trial court and a sharply divided New York State Court of Appeals found
that "the prosecutor had stated a race neutral reason for the challenges to the Latino
jurors. 2 67 Despite having to meet a poorly defined threshold of race discrimination
in the case, Hernandez' legal team spoke of Latina/os almost exclusively in ethnic
terms. According to Hernandez' attorneys, "Because of the integral relationship
between speaking Spanish and being Latino, a decision based on Spanish language
is tantamount to a decision based on Latino national origin. 2 68 Further emphasizing
the "integral connection between language and national origin," Hernandez' legal
team cited the codification of the Lau Title VI opinion in U.S. statutory law.269
In a similar vein, MALDEF and the Department of Puerto Rican Community
Affairs for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, in a joint amici brief to the U.S.
Supreme Court, highlighted the extent to which other Latino legal organizations had

262. For representative employment cases, see Gutierrez v. Southeastern Judicial District County of LA.
Municipal Court, 861 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated as moot by 490 U.S. 1016 (1989); Juradov. Eleven-Fifty
Corp., 813 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1987); Garciav. Gloor,618 F.2d 264 (5th Ci. 1980). In terms of voting rights cases,
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,647-49 (1966), much like Lau, used statutory prohibitions (the Voting Rights
Act of 1965,42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-la (1994)) rather than the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution to invalidate
English-only voting rules that impacted Latina/os in New York. In response to English-only amendments at the state
level, Latina/os challenged these on First Amendment grounds. See Ruiz v. Hull, 957 P.2d 984 (Ariz. 1998). The
most prominent jury discrimination case is discussed infra, notes, 264-279.
263. See supra notes 218, 239-240 and accompanying text.
264. 500 U.S. 352 (1991) (plurality opinion).
265. Id. at 355-56. No other Latina/os were selected for the jury. See id. at 356.
266. Id.
267. Brief for Petitioner at 4, Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991) (No. 89-7645) (emphasis added).
268. Id. at 11.
269. Id. at 12 & n.5 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f) (2000)).
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come to accept their ethnic minority status in the law.27 ° According to the MALDEF
brief,
the inextricable correlation between the native language of national origin
groups and national origin itself which comprise the identifiable characteristic
upon which it is impermissible to discriminate. In the case of Hispanics, this
country's second largest minority population and largest linguistic minority
group, Spanish is the native language at issue. Whether disparate treatment
based upon the linguistic identity of Hispanics equals national origin
discrimination is immediately evident from even summary reviews of the
historical presence of Spanish in the United States, the nature of bilingualism,
and the continued adverse treatment Hispanics are subjected to because they
"
retain their sociolinguistic identity.27
'
While such a statement suggests that MALDEF had retreated dramatically from the
color claims
that it advanced in earlier school desegregation and bilingual education
cases, 2 72 a more plausible reading draws attention to the way in which MALDEF and
its allies, including Hernandez' legal team, believed that racial and ethnic national
origin distinctions had become irrelevant and interchangeable in legal discourse.273
Although the bilingual education cases suggested a change in this regard, 274 there
seemed to remain an unspoken assumption about the racialized non-Whiteness of
Latina/os. Particularly when the prosecutor's challenge targeted bilingual Spanish
speakers-when the ability to speak Spanish "represents an immutable characteristic
of the Hispanic community on the whole" 27 -there could be no doubt, at least in the
arguments of MALDEF, of the non-White color positioning of the Latino
community. 276
Importantly, the Hernandez Court made it plain that a racial and not an ethnic
animus must be proven in order to find a violation of equal protection.277 Although

270. Brief for the Mexican American Legal Defense & Educational Fund & the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, Department of Puerto Rican Community Affairs in the United States, as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner,
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991) (No. 89-7654).
271. Id. at 4.
272. See supra notes 136-144 and accompanying text.
273. Jurisprudence that collapsed terminology for Latina/os began as early as Chief Justice Earl Warren's
opinion in Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954), which was decided two weeks after Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483,494 (1954). In Hernandez, Chief Justice Warren noted that "[t]he exclusion of otherwise
eligible persons from jury service solely because of their ancestry or nationalorigin is discrimination prohibited
by the Fourteenth Amendment." Hernandez, 347 U.S. at 479 (emphasis added). This was the first time in the postBrown era that the Court clarified that a "national origin" classification could violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
According to Professor Juan Perea,
The Court, however, was dealing with a classification based upon ancestry, the systematic
exclusion of persons of Mexican descent. For those persons who were U.S. citizens by birth,
their national origin-their place of birth-was the United States. The Hernandez v. Texas
opinion refers to the terms "ancestry" and "national origin" as though they meant the same thing
when they do not.
Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and the Constitution: Beyond the Black and White Binary Constitution, 36 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 571, 587-88 (1995). This loose use of terms continued in the "tri-ethnic" school desegregation cases, where
concepts of race and ethnicity were used interchangeably. See supra Part II.A.
274. See supra Part lI.A.
275. Brief for the Mexican American Legal Defense & Educational Fund & the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, Department of Puerto Rican Community Affairs in the United States, supra note 270, at 3.
276. See id.
277. Ironically, while purporting to distinguish racial discrimination from ethnic discrimination, the words
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Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion conceded that language discrimination may
'
sometimes be treated as a "surrogate for race under an equal protection analysis,"278
it contributed to ajurisprudence that excluded many of the ways in which Latina/os,
as well as other bilingual groups, had historically been racialized as non-White in
the United States.279 Ultimately, Hernandez represented the culmination of an
ineffective struggle that began immediately after the attempt in Keyes to move
beyond "bi-racial" terminology. Beginning with Lau, the nation's courts began to
explicitly sever the connection between ethnic discrimination, the process of
racialization, and the role of the color line in U.S. culture and life. While Latina/o
litigants maintained that there was no difference between racial and ethnic animi,
courts employed language to focus almost exclusively on the permissible ethnic
dimensions of the issue. In a post-ethnic English-only United States, such cases
revealed just how far outside of the color line Latina/os had been placed in the legal
imagination. Such a development, in turn, would have profound consequences in
attempts by institutions of higher education to diversify the color of their student
bodies.
IV. A PEOPLE OF COLOR: DIVERSITY AND DISCRIMINATION IN
I
HIGHER EDUCATION
In the summer of 1970, the Rocky Mountain Chapter of the Anti-Defamation
League of B'nai B'rith (ADL) was investigating discriminatory hiring practices at
the Gates Rubber Company in Denver, Colorado. When asked if the company
discriminated against Jews, one manager noted "that he had never thought of Jews
in recent times in terms of minority status in the same way as blacks and
Hispanos. '2 8' The manager's comment reflected a color reorientation of the ADL's

mission. Indeed, one ADL document from the early 1970s indicated that the highest
number of complaints received by the Denver office of the ADL involved the issue
of "Reverse Discrimination."2 '' The issue, according to the ADL, forced the
organization to reconsider "the heart of what should be the ADL-B'nai B'rithin the struggle of
Jewish Community-position, posture and responsibility
28 2
disadvantaged racial minorities to achieve equality.1

Such tensions in the ADL spoke volumes about the dramatic reconfiguration of
the color line in U.S. culture and life during that time. Whereas Jews, like Latina/os
and in some cases other European ethnics, Southeastern Asians, and Asian ethnics,
had occupied an ambiguous and at times highly contested position between
conceptions of ethnicity, race, and color in the socio-legal history of the United

"race" and "ethnicity" were used synonymously throughout Justice Kennedy's opinion. Perea, supra note 273, at

595 ("The plurality opinion in Hernandez v. New York, authored by Justice Kennedy, uses the words 'race' and
'ethnicity' as though they were interchangeable.").
278. Hemandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 371 (1991) (plurality opinion).
279. See Perea, supra note 273, at 595-98.
280. Memorandum from Sheldon Steinhauser, Anti-Defamation League, to Harold Braverman, AntiDefamation League (June 4, 1970) (on file with Penrose Library, University of Denver).
281. Anti-Defamation League Civil Rights Comm., Minutes from Committee Meeting (Jan. 21, 1974) (on
file with Penrose Library, University of Denver).
282. Memorandum from Gilbert Goldstein, Chairman, Anti-Defamation League Civil Rights Comm. to AntiDefamation League Civil Rights Comm. Members (May 1969) (on file with Penrose Library, University of Denver).
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States, 3 the beginning of the 1970s saw a new color understanding emerge that
seemed to place Latina/os, in contrast to Jews and other European ethnics, firmly on
the non-White side of the color line.2 4 Despite legal and political attempts through
school desegregation litigation, affirmative action, and other government programs
to protect and provide access and opportunities to non-White groups, being nonWhite carried very few of the benefits of Whiteness. Particularly as Latina/os came
to be identified and to identify as a people of color in the nation's workplaces and
college campuses, a newly expansive color line was re-stigmatized by legal attempts
to deny the historical deployment of color privilege in the United States.
This final section briefly assesses the color positioning of Latina/os in affirmative
action and higher education jurisprudence litigation. While bilingual education and
language discrimination cases were de-conflating race and ethnicity, the categorical
distinction that courts made between racial (i.e., color) discrimination as opposed
to national origin (i.e., ethnic) discrimination became impossible to maintain on
campuses that attempted to reflect the multicolor hues of the nation. Instead,
Latina/os, along with other legally non-White African Americans, Asian Americans,
Pacific Islanders, and American Indians, sought to defend the constitutionality of
various schools' affirmative action programs. As part of a broad coalition of people
of color who had a "common nature of problems, interests and needs" in seeking
redress from "a white racist society," 285 Latina/os sought to preserve the limited
legal recognition of their non-White status. Similar to the U.S. Supreme Court's
treatment of language discrimination in the bilingual education cases, the loose and
inconsistent use of terminology in the nation's "tri-ethnic" affirmative action
jurisprudence provided one means by which the color line and a color conscious
remedy came to be denied in U.S. law. Though Latina/os were legally
conceptualized as a people of color on the nation's multiracial campuses, it had little
judicial meaning when Whites just as easily claimed to be the victims of racial
discrimination.
A. Ethnics All: Multicolor Denial and the Diversity Rationale
When admissions officers at the University of California-Davis Medical School
received an application from Allan Bakke in late November 1972, little did they
realize that their admissions program would set into motion what the New York

283. See, e.g., KAREN BRODKIN, How JEWS BECAME WHITE FOLKS AND WHAT THAT SAYS ABOUT RACE IN

AMERICA (1998) (examining how Jews came to be viewed, by themselves and others, as White in the decades
following World War 11); DAVID R. ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE AND THE MAKING OF THE
AMERICAN WORKING CLASS (rev. ed. 1999) (exploring how European working class immigrants utilized the
"wages" of labor power and hierarchy to become considered White); DAVID R. ROEDIGER, WORKING TOWARD
WHITENESS: How AMERICA'S IMMIGRANTS BECOME WHrrE (2005) (detailing the process by which Eastern and
Southern European immigrants to the United States "became" White in the twentieth century). Other scholars argue
that such "new" European immigrants to the United States at the end of the nineteenth century immediately held
important social, political, and legal advantages that put into question each group's claim to non-Whiteness. E.g.,
GUGLIELMO, supra note 24, at 5-7; JACOBSON, supra note 26, at 42-44.
284. See MACLEAN, supra note 49, at 155-224 (comparing the color positioning of Latina/os as non-White
and Jews as White after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
285. Hannah B. Best, Sw. Intergroup Council, Report to the Southwest Intergroup Council on the Ghost
Ranch Conversation I (May 1, 1972) (on file with the Special Collections and University Archives, Stanford
University).
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Times would eventually describe as "the most important matter affecting race
relations and minority groups in the United States since the [Brown] schooldesegregation ruling of 1954. ' ' 286 The admissions program at issue in Regents of the
University of Californiav. Bakke 287 not only put to the test the constitutionality of
highly contested and controversial programs designed to take "affirmative action"
to redress inequities in U.S. culture and life, but it also placed squarely before the
U.S. Supreme Court, and the nation at large, the meaning of the color line. As one
account declared, "If, as some people might say, this is a case where one man is
carrying the ball for all white males, they could not have picked a more
representative specimen. Bakke is just under six feet tall, has blond hair, blue
eyes-'very white,' some might say. '' 28 8 That Bakke, as a phenotypically "exact"
representative of White America, could unabashedly claim his Whiteness yet deny
his color privilege in claiming racial discrimination by the medical school spoke
volumes about what had emerged as an inconsistent, confusing, and inarticulate
discourse of ethnicity, race, and color in the United States. 289 The litigation of the
case and its ultimate outcome cemented the irrelevance of race and color to an
equality discourse that emerged out of Keyes and Lau. To be sure, Bakke, as the
third foundational case in the nation's "tri-ethnic" jurisprudence, powerfully
demonstrated the U.S. Supreme Court's commitment to the ethnicity paradigm in
understanding discrimination in a multiracial and color conscious nation.
Nowhere was the contest over the legal consequence of ethnicity, race, and color
clearer than in the briefs submitted to the U.S. Supreme Court before it decided
Bakke. Indeed, alone among the foundational "tri-ethnic" cases surveyed in this
Article, the Bakke briefs represented the full range of voices that make up the United
States' rich and troubling history of ethnic variety, racialized difference, color
consciousness, and color denial. Despite this, the briefs were organized along color
lines (i.e., White ethnics versus racialized non-Whites). As a result, the briefs
indicated the degree to which a newly restructured color line had manifested itself
paradoxically in both color-conscious and color-blind terms in the nation's
constitutional and legal order.

286. Robert Lindsey, White/Caucasian--andRejected, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 3, 1977 (Magazine), at 42.
287. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
288. Lindsey, supranote 286, at 42 (emphasis added). What is perhaps the most troubling aspect of the New
York Times description of Bakke is that the terms and imagery are not too different from the White Aryan ideal of
the Nazi state. Though such an ideal had seemingly been discredited with the defeat of Nazi Germany in World War
11,a discourse of physical perfection, based on the division between Whiteness and non-Whiteness, percolated deep
into the twentieth century in the United States with a particular resonance that impacted Latina/os. See STERN, supra
note 30, at 199-209 (analyzing the forced sterilization of Mexican women in the United States during the 1960s
and 1970s and the state's endorsement of such practices as seen in the class action law suit Madrigal v. Quilligan).
289. See supra Parts 11-11. This conceptual collapse and confusion appeared very early in the factual scenario
leading to Bakke's lawsuit. Peter C. Storandt, Assistant to the Dean for Student Affairs and Admissions at the
University of California-Davis Medical School, and others would say that Bakke's eventual suit was a response to
Bakke's frustration about "quotas" for racial minorities. Lindsey, supra note 286, at 45-46. Storandt's reply letter,
in which he indicated that he believed that Bakke deserved a straight answer, described the program as one for
"members of ethnic minority groups." Brief of Amici Curiae for The National Urban League et al. app. a at 2a,
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (No. 76-811); see also Ira S. Lowry, The Science and
Politics of Ethnic Enumeration 1-2 (Jan. 1980) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Special Collections and
University Archives, Stanford University) (questioning the ability of the Bureau of Census to conduct a rigorous
"scientific ethnic census" while at the same time the author defines ethnicity as an identity in which members share
a "common race, religion, language or national origin").
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In an amicus brief in support of Bakke's claim submitted by the Order Sons of
Italy in America (OSIA), for instance, that organization noted the history of its
constituents' transition into Whiteness by stating that Italian Americans are a
"minority group which, although it has suffered discrimination for many years, has
now become part of the [White] 'majority' discriminated against by preferential
admissions programs. '290 Hence, the OSIA brief articulated an ethnic theory of
discrimination that disregarded the legacy of color. Whiteness, according to the
OSIA amicus brief, conferred no privileges:
"[T]he white majority is pluralistic, containing within itself a multitude of
religious and ethnic minorities-Catholics, Jews, Italians, Irish, Poles-and
many others who are vulnerable to prejudice and who to this day suffer the
effects of past discrimination. Such groups have only recently begun to enjoy the
benefits of a free society and should not be exposed to new discriminatory
bars....291
In a similar vein, the joint amici brief of a collection of Jewish American, Greek
American, Italian American, Polish American, and Ukrainian American
organizations noted that their individual constituents, like "people of color," could
"credibly...claim to have been subject to generalized societal discrimination. '"292
And although one amici brief submitted by an assortment of organizations that
included organizations representing Jewish and Italian-American groups indicated
a willingness to embrace Whiteness, it was an identity, according to their argument,
that had little social utility:
All "whites" are consigned to the same category deserving of no special
consideration. That is not the way "whites" see themselves, or indeed are, in
social reality. Some may be "whites," pure and simple. But almost all have some
specific ethnic or religious identification, which, to the individual involved, may
mean a distinctive history of past-and perhaps some present-discrimination.293
Another brief, submitted by the Polish American Congress, argued that racial,
ethnic, and color animi were one and the same:
We ask this Court whether there is a substantial difference between a Black
being called a "Nigger" and a Polish American being called a "Pollack", [sic]
whether telling a Black or Mexican American he cannot qualify is substantially
more degrading than telling a Polish American the same thing; whether the lack
of recognition of Blacks and Latins in senior levels of corporate management is
more serious than the lack of recognition of Polish and Italian Americans.294

290. Brief Amicus Curiae for the Order Sons of Italy in America in Support of Respondent at 2, Regents of
the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (No. 76-811). The brief went on to note that "[tihe experience of
the Italian in this country has been too often that of a minority excluded from positions in the corporate and
professional world." Id.
291. Id. at 22 n.16 (quoting Larry M. Lavinsky, DeFunis v. Odegaard: The "Non-Decision" with a Message,
75 COLUM. L. REv. 520, 527 (1975)).
292. Brief of American Jewish Committee et al., Amici Curiae at 41-42, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (No. 76-811) (emphasis added).
293. Brief of Amici Curiae of Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith et al. at 18, Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (No. 76-811) (emphasis added).
294. Brief of the Polish American Congress et al. as Amici Curiae at 10, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
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Though the brief spoke in racialized color terms, these Polish Americans, like other
White ethnics, nevertheless unashamedly claimed that Whiteness bestowed no
special privilege.295
All of the White ethnic briefs submitted before Bakke was decided referenced
their arguments in relation to the color line in the United States but rejected its value
to the legal analysis. One brief suggested that the color line only had regional
significance:
[I]n some areas of the nation, statewide segregated education never existed and,
in many states, laws prohibiting discrimination in employment, housing and
public accommodations were enacted as early as 1945, nine years before Brown.
The years since then have been marked by significant black progress. Many
members of minority groups have been able to achieve a substantial measure of
affluence and professional recognition and to live and work in unsegregated
milieus.296
In another brief, a Polish American organization noted that California "represents
the great mosiac [sic] that makes up America. Its climate, location and other
desirable characteristics attracted and still attract all kinds of people: farmers, actors,
retired persons, youngsters, adventurers, settlers, Italian Americans, Mexican
Americans, Polish Americans, Blacks, White [sic], Orientals and on and on." 297
Collectively, the amici briefs submitted by such White ethnic groups indicated that
the United States is a nation of minorities and, as a result, unequivocally rejected the
of what they understood
necessity of a color analysis in the equal protection claims
2 98
as a multiethnic, as opposed to a multiracialized, society.
What is most striking in the White ethnic Bakke briefs is the collective
articulation of a "stigma" that would be attached to non-Whites who claimed-with

Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (No. 76-811).
295. For example, the Polish American Congress brief states:
The greatest irony of this result is that many Whites who have championed the cause of civil
rights have ended up being in this "forgotten and disfavored" group. Why are "Whites" who
never practiced discrimination, but fought for and championed equality, and who themselves
suffered discrimination obliged to continue to suffer simply because other Whites practiced
racial discrimination? If Whites are to suffer for the "greater good" then for how long and for
whose benefit?
Id. at 12.
296. Brief of American Jewish Committee et al., supra note 292, at 36 (emphasis added). The brief went on
to use evidence of "black progress" in rejecting the "diversity in higher education" rationale:
The post-Brown white medical student has had twelve years of primary and secondary education
and four years of college as well as exposure to newspapers, radios, television and everyday
living in our multi-racial society. It is fatuous to say that the presence of some black faces in
medical school will develop in white students an an-hanced [sic] awareness of the medical
concerns of minorities and of the difficulties of effective delivery of health care services in
minority communities.
Id. at 29 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
297. Brief of the Polish American Congress et al., supra note 294, at 6.
298. The Anti-Defamation League brief articulates this point most clearly:
Does equal protection by the State, commanded by the Fourteenth Amendment, mean one thing
as applied to whites and another when applied to nonwhites? Since whites and nonwhites, by
definition, exhaust the universe, to what are the rights of nonwhites to be equal, if not the rights
of whites? To what are the rights of whites to be equal if not to those of nonwhites?
Brief of Amici Curiae of Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith et al., supra note 293, at 13.
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the sanction of the state-some of the privileges of Whiteness. Indeed, such
arguments made it absolutely clear that any legal claims to non-Whiteness would
always be inferior to Whiteness. To illustrate, the brief of the Order Sons of Italy in
America noted that some "state preferences for whites... carry with them the badge
of superioity.' '299 In contrast, the same brief argued that a state preference for nonWhites carries the "inevitable assumption" that the
preferred races are inferior to the non-preferred races. Astigma will attach to all
members of the preferred races in all professions. In particular, it will create a
class of doctors viewed by the public as "second-rate"....Thestigma attaches to
all members of the preferred race to the detriment of all persons,3 many of whom
may be reluctant to use the services of minority professionals. 00
Although such a "stigma" had historically worked to the detriment of those
racialized as non-White, regardless of either their credentials or the state's
involvement, such arguments clarified the power and perseverance of color
consciousness in claiming "reverse discrimination."
In contrast, a broad coalition of Latino, Asian American, and Black groups, both
collectively and individually, sought to defend the non-White status of "people of
color." In every instance, the relevant comparison was not between ethnic groups,
but rather in relation to the fierce maintenance of a White/non-White color line
throughout the history of the United States. A collection of Mexican American
organizations, for instance, recounted the "PERVASIVE AND SYSTEMMATIC
[SIC] RACIAL PREJUDICE" directed against Latina/os. 30 ' Beginning as early as
1849, "[a]n undercurrent of the desire to insure white dominance was the desire to
insure that the Mexican (who was generally of Indian stock) did not interfere with
the 'manifest destiny' of the Anglo settlers coming from the East. 30 2 Over time,
according to the brief, Latina/os were consistently racialized as non-White.30 3
Accordingly, when measured against Whites, Latina/os and Blacks performed at
much lower levels in segregated schools, 3 4 had a much higher incidence of poverty

299. Brief of Amicus Curiae for the Order Sons of Italy in America, supra note 290, at 11.
300. Id. at 21 (emphasis added). Another brief argued that
minority students will perceive that they are beneficiaries of a double standard, which is apt to
play havoc with their own self-esteem, not to mention the impact it may have on others who
manage to graduate without any favoritism.
A significant adverse side effect of preferential treatment is likely to be that those minority
students of high ability and accomplishment who excel strictly on merit will nevertheless carry
the stigma upon graduation that they, too, were beneficiaries of a double standard.
Brief of American Jewish Committee et al., supra note 292, at 43 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
301. Brief of Amici Curiae Mexican American Legal Defense & Educational Fund et al. at 6, Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (No. 76-811).
302. Id. at 7 (emphasis added). The impact "was the decision by the [California Constitutional] Convention
to leave to the legislature the right to admit to suffrage 'Indians or descendants of Indians."' Id. (quoting CAL.
CONST. of 1849, art. II, § 2). Later, it was noted that the "Indian....also was the victim of an officially sanctioned
policy of genocide." Id. at 9.
303. For example, although California explicitly allowed for the segregation of Blacks, Asians, and Indians,
Mexican school children found themselves in segregated schools because they were racialized based "upon either
[their] 'Mongolian' features or [their] Indian ancestry." Id. at 11 (quoting CHARLEs M. WOLLENBERG, ALL
DELIBERATE SPEED: SEGREGATION AND EXCLuSION IN CALIFORNIA ScHOOLs, 1855-1975, at 118 (1976)).
304. Id. at 15.
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and unemployment, 3°5 lived in dramatically higher proportional numbers 3in
07
substandard housing, 3 ° and were overrepresented in the criminal justice system.
Along the same lines, the Asian American Bar Association of the Greater Bay
Area (AABA) detailed a vicious and systematic history of color discrimination in
its Bakke amicus brief.3°8 From anti-Chinese legislation that culminated in the
exclusion of Chinese immigrants from the United States 3°9 to anti-Japanese laws and
jurisprudence that came to a sordid crescendo in Japanese American internment and
segregated schools, 310 the AABA highlighted the systematic non-White legal
construction of the Asian American community. Perhaps responding to the "model
minority" myth,1 the AABA brief noted that "Asian Americans have yet to reach
parity with white Americans in many areas, ,,312 including in3
in education, 3
314
and in direct legal services to a bilingual
employment and income levels,
community.31
Finally, the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund and Aspira of
America sought to defend the UC-Davis Medical School affirmative action
program.316 Accordingly, their brief focused on the relationship between law and
color and noted that, "as [the] equal protection doctrine has evolved," the relevant
comparison has shifted to whether "other victimized minorities" were "in positions
comparable to that of blacks. 3 17 Citing the Court's observation in Keyes that
"Hispanos" and "Negroes" share "economic and cultural deprivation," 31 8 the brief
argued that
[t]he persons or groups on whose behalf the "strict scrutiny" standard has been
applied share three significant characteristics. First, they labor under the
continuing effects of previous discrimination and deprivation. Second, they
share immutable characteristics, those of race or national origin, which have
been used to stigmatize and set them apart from members of the majority group.
Finally, they historically have been powerless within the political arena.319
For these reasons, the brief indicated that historical discrimination against Latina/os
and Blacks was fundamentally different than that experienced by White ethnics.

305. Id. at 17-23.
306. Id. at 23-25.
307. Id.at 26-27.
308. Brief of Amicus Curiae Asian American Bar Association of the Greater Bay Area in Support of
Petitioners, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (No. 76-811).
309. Id. at 6-8.
310. Id. at 8-11.

311. See supra note 229.
312. Brief of Amicus Curiae Asian American Bar Association of the Greater Bay Area, supra note 308, at
12 (emphasis added).
313. Id. at 12-13.
314. Id. at 13-14.
315. Id. at 14-16.
316. Brief of Amici Curiae the Puerto Rican Legal Defense & Education Fund & Aspira of America, Regents
of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (No. 76-811).
317. Id. at 10.
318. Id. at 11 n.21 (quoting Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1,413 U.S. 189, 197-98 (1973)).
319. Id. at II (citation omitted).
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Collectively, the legal arguments made by the various Latina/o organizations
indicated a very different understanding about the consequences of color, race, and
ethnicity as a matter of law. By describing long, yet different, systematic histories
of discrimination directed at Latina/os, Blacks, and Asian Americans as non-Whites,
the briefs framed the consideration as one of a color/race hierarchy rather than one
of ethnic pluralism. Indeed, it was their racialization as non-Whites, according to the
briefs, that had effectively made Latina/os, Asian Americans, American Indians, and
Blacks a "people of color" constitutionally distinguishable from the White ethnics
that Allan Bakke represented.
Perhaps for these reasons, the U.S. Supreme Court was deeply divided over the
precise dimensions of the constitutional and legal issues that Bakke presented.
Justice Lewis Powell's plurality opinion became the determinative analysis in the
case. 32 Most important, Justice Powell's opinion plainly stated that discrimination
based on ethnic, racial, and color distinctions were functionally the same. According
to Justice Powell:
It is far too late to argue that the guarantee of equal protection to all persons
permits the recognition of special wards entitled to a degree of protection greater
than that accorded others. "The Fourteenth Amendment is not directed solely
against discrimination due to a 'two-class theory'-that is, based upon
differences between 'white' and Negro. 321
In making this point, Justice Powell cited language directly from the U.S. Supreme
Court's opinion in Hernandezv. Texas, which addressed the long-standing exclusion
of people of "Mexican descent" from juries in Texas.322
Ironically, the color in-betweeness of Latina/os, as articulated in Hernandez,gave
Justice Powell the language that he needed to argue that Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence had become expansive enough to allow most "whites"-based on their
ethnicity-to "lay claim to a history of prior discrimination at the hands of the State
and private individuals. 323 Nonetheless, Justice Powell indicated that an institution
of higher education had a distinct and constitutionally permissible interest in
maintaining an ambiguously diverse and multicolor student body. According to
Justice Powell, it "is of paramount importance" to the nation's universities to recruit
"students who will contribute most to the robust exchange of ideas. 324 As a result,

320. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (plurality opinion).
321. Id. at 295 (footnote omitted) (quoting Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478 (1954)).
322. Hernandez, 347 U.S. at 476. The fact that this case was decided at the same time as Brown has not been
lost on legal scholars. As one author has noted:
[T]he Court was considering the issues of Latino [racial] identity and of school desegregation
concurrently. Because the Court carefully dodged the question of Latinos' racial identity in
Hernandez... it is not surprising that the Court did not address the question of Latino school
segregation in Brown. After all, Brown occurred within the familiar Black-White binary.
Bowman, supra note 200, at 1776. Recent scholarship, however, has called into question the "other White" thesis
and the suggestion that Warren could not comprehend Mexican American non-Whiteness. See Johnson, supra note
3, at 170-78.
323. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 295. The groundwork had already been laid in McDonald v.Santa Fe Trail
TransportationCo. in which the U.S. Supreme Court held, in an opinion authored by Justice Thurgood Marshall,
that White persons could maintain a section 1981 suit. 427 U.S. 273, 286-87 (1976). McDonald,however, involved
alleged discrimination against a White person in favor of a Black individual. Id. at 275.
324. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Justice Powell made it clear that universities could continue to consider color and
ethnicity, among other factors, for purposes of diversity when evaluating a student's
academic credentials, musical ability, academic gifts, and other individual skills and
traits.325 Justice Powell argued that in such a diversity scheme, the "race or ethnic
background may be deemed a 'plus' in a particular applicant's file, yet it does not
insulate the individual from comparison with all the other candidates for the
available seats., 326 Although Justice Powell did not define what he meant by a
"plus," he indicated that an acceptable diversity program would be one in which an
"applicant who loses out on the last available seat to another candidate receiving a
'plus' on the basis of ethnic background will not have been foreclosed from all
consideration for that seat simply because he was not the right color or had the
wrong surname. ' 327 In these terms, non-Whiteness carried the nearly equivalent
value of every individual skill, characteristic, or trait. One essay, written a decade
after the Bakke decision, underscored the problematic nature of treating racial
identity as little different from such mutable characteristics.
[T]o say that two centuries of struggle for the most basic of civil rights have
been mostly about freedom from racial categorization rather than freedom from
racial oppression, is to trivialize the lives and deaths of those who have suffered
under racism. To pretend... that the issue presented in Bakke was the same as the
issue in Brown is to pretend that history never happened and that the present
doesn't exist.2 '
After Bakke and the emergence of a diversity rationale in the higher education
admissions process, it became apparent that the nation's "tri-ethnic" education
jurisprudence had changed dramatically in a few short years. The U.S. Supreme
Court had shifted from recognizing that Latina/os suffered "identical discrimination
in treatment" to that of Blacks 329-and were thus entitled to some of the limited
privileges of non-Whiteness in the nation's constitutional regime-to the position
that there was no fundamental difference between the historical and contemporary
discriminatory experiences of non-White groups in relation to those of Whites.
Vilma Martinez, the president of MALDEF, lamented the "national amnesia"
regarding the very real differences in racial inequality that threatened to
"annihilate[]" all of the "civil rights gains of the [19]50's and [19]60's" made on
behalf of people of color.33 ° Though the litigation catalyzed by Allan Bakke
convinced the Court that everyone potentially could be discriminated against as an

325. See id. at 316-17. Justice Powell, moreover, was careful to emphasize that in his view "[e]thnic
diversity... is only one element in a range of factors a university properly may consider in attaining the goal of a
heterogeneous student body." Id. at 314.
326. Id. at 317.
327. Id. at 318 (emphasis added). Justice Powell further wrote: "It would mean only that his combined
qualifications, which may have included similar nonobjective factors, did not outweigh those of the other applicant.
His qualifications would have been weighed fairly and competitively, and he would have no basis to complain of
unequal treatment under the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
328. Stephen L. Carter, Comment, When Victims Happen to Be Black, 97 YALE L.J. 420, 433-34 (1988).
329. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1973).
330. Vilma S. Martinez, President, Mexican Am. Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, The Current Crisis in Education,
Address at the University of California-San Francisco Medical Center 5 (May 26, 1978) (transcript available in the
Special Collections and University Archives, Stanford University).
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ethnic minority, Bakke's own limited triumph as the "representative specimen" of
"
' highlighted how paradoxically color conscious and color unconscious
Whiteness33
the nation's tri-ethnic jurisprudence had become.
B. Color [Dis]Entitlementand the Possibility of a Post-RacialUnited States at
the Turn of the Twenty-First Century
One year after Bakke was decided, Professor William Van Alstyne wrote a
scathing critique of the continued operation of racial consciousness in U.S.
constitutional law.332 Van Alstyne was particularly disparaging of the nation's triethnic school jurisprudence and indicated his view that race and color should be
stricken from the nation's legal vocabulary:
[O]ne gets beyond racism by getting beyond it now: by a complete, resolute, and
credible commitment never to tolerate in one's own life-or in the life or
practices of one's government-the differential treatment of other human beings
by race. Indeed, that is the great lesson for government itself to teach: in all we
do in life, whatever we do in life, to treat any person less well than another or to
favor any more than another for being black or white or brown or red, is wrong.
Let that be our fundamental law and we shall have a Constitution universally
worth expounding.333
Though color-blindness, as re-proposed by Van Alstyne, had long been a lofty
ideal,3" the nation's legal system would continue to struggle with the very real
impact of a nation divided along racialized color lines.
That ethnic, racial, and color considerations would continue to animate legal
discourse beyond Bakke should come as no surprise given the continued inconsistent
use of these terms in legal discourse. And, as a result of such inconsistent use, these
categories continue to have little analytical value. In the much discussed case of
Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji,335 decided in 1987, Justice Byron White
addressed whether persons of Arab descent should be considered to be non-White
in order to receive protection under section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.336
The case seemingly provided an opportunity to unravel the meaning of ethnic,
racial, and color distinctions for persons of a group, like Latina/os, who were not
receiving the benefits of Whiteness. Because the language of ethnicity, race, and
color had become so entangled and confused, however, the Court made some
troubling observations. Justice White, quoting with approval the opinion of the

331. Lindsey, supra note 286, at 42.
332. William Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage:Race, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 46 U. Clu. L.
REv. 775 (1979).
333. Id. at 809-10 (second emphasis added).
334. E.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537,559 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Our constitution is color-blind, and
neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.").
335. 481 U.S. 604 (1987). In Al-Khazraji, a plaintiff of Arab descent brought a civil rights claim against his
employer under section 1981, which provides that "[a]ll persons...shall have the same right.. .to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, [and] give evidence.. .as is enjoyed by white citizens...." 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2000).
336. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. at 609-10. Framed in this manner, the question in the case revolved around
whether "the assumption that all those who might be deemed Caucasians today were thought to be of the same race
when § 1981 became law in the 19th century; and it may be that a variety of ethnic groups, including Arabs, are now
considered to be within the Caucasian race." Id. at 610.
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Third Circuit, noted that at "'a minimum,"' section 1981 "reaches discrimination
against an individual 'because he or she is genetically part of an ethnically and
physiognomically distinctive sub-grouping of homo sapiens."'337 In other words,
Whiteness, as envisioned by the U.S. Supreme Court, was literally about the color
of one's skin.
Yet, remarkably similar to much of the school desegregation discourse regarding
Latina/os, Justice White rejected such a biological explanation and instead specified
that section 198 1's language about color was really about ethnicity.338 Justice White
accordingly reasoned that at the time the legislation was drafted, in the years
immediately following the Civil War, contemporaries commonly referred to the
"Scandinavian" race, the "Spanish" race, the "German" race, the "Arab" race, and
other races, who were all referenced in relation to the "Anglo-Saxon" race.339 In
language that could have been taken straight from the pages of the White ethnic
briefs in Bakke, Justice White concluded "that Congress intended to protect from
discrimination identifiable classes of persons who are subjected to intentional
discrimination solely because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics.'
Whiteness, as envisioned by section 1981, was not about the color line; it was about
ethnic differentiation. 34' The Al-Khazraji decision is especially problematic because
it suggests that every ethnic group can be racialized as non-White, which leaves
color (outside of its strict physiological sense) devoid of any substantive analytical
meaning.
Al-Khazraji thus allowed color to reemerge in an expansive national "tri-ethnic"
342
jurisprudence--one that is seemingly limited to its "distinctive physiognomy.
Importantly, Justice Brennan, architect of the "tri-ethnic" language in Keyes, wrote
a separate concurrence to Justice White's opinion in Al-Khazraji:
I write separately only to point out that the line between discrimination based on
ancestry or ethnic characteristics, and discrimination based on place or nation

337.
1986)).

Id. at 613 (emphasis added) (quoting Al-Khazraji v. Saint Francis Coll., 784 F.2d 505, 517 (3d Cir.

338. In his opinion, Justice White highlighted the problematic nature of racial categorization and, interestingly
enough, chose not to include Latina/os in the equation:
There is a common popular understanding that there are three major human races-Caucasoid,
Mongoloid, and Negroid. Many modem biologists and anthropologists, however, criticize racial
classifications as arbitrary and of little use in understanding the variability of human beings. It
is said that genetically homogeneous populations do not exist and traits are not discontinuous
between populations; therefore, a population can only be described in terms of relative
frequencies of various traits. Clear-cut categories do not exist. The particular traits which have
generally been chosen to characterize races have been criticized as having little biological
significance. It has been found that differences between individuals of the same race are often
greater than the differences between the "average" individuals of different races. These
observations and others have led some, but not all, scientists to conclude that racial
classifications are for the most part sociopolitical, rather than biological, in nature.
Id. at 610 n.4.
339. Id. at611-12.
340. Id. at613.
341. See id. at 613 ("[W]e have little trouble concluding that Congress intended to protect from discrimination
identifiable classes of persons who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of their ancestry or
ethnic characteristics.").
342. Id. at 613. However, Justice White's opinion specifically explained that "a distinctive physiognomy is
not essential to qualify for § 1981 protection." Id. (emphasis added).
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of...origin, is not a bright one. It is true that one's ancestry-the ethnic group
from which an individual and his or her ancestors are descended-is not
necessarily the same as one's national origin-the country "where a person was
born, or, more broadly, the country from which his or her ancestors came."
Often, however, the two are identical as a factual matter: one was born in the
nation whose primary stock is one's own ethnic group. Moreover, national origin
claims have been treated as ancestry or ethnicity claims in some
circumstances ....
I therefore read the Court's opinion to state only that
discrimination based on birthplacealone is insufficient to state a claim under §
1981.
Justice Brennan's concurrence indicated an attempt to refine his own "tri-ethnic"
jurisprudence. Indeed, if birthplace alone was insufficient as a matter of law, his
concurrence indicated that there were certain groups-such as Arabs and
Latina/os-whose "ethnic ancestry" in the United States had become the basis for
some form of unlawful discrimination. Unfortunately, Justice Brennan did not
elaborate further on what this actually means. Perhaps read in tandem with Justice
White's opinion, Justice Brennan's concurrence signified the extent to which ethnic
discrimination should be evaluated in racial terms. And in these terms, racial
discrimination could be evaluated only in relation to a White/non-White color
divide.
The rhetorical devices used by Justices White and Brennan in Al-Khazraji are
significant because Latina/os themselves, in the joint amici brief submitted by the
Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund and the Puerto Rican Legal
Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF/PRLDEF brief), contributed much to the
language that was ultimately used in the opinion. 3' Indeed, acting in concert for one
of the first times in the history of the nation's "tri-ethnic" jurisprudence, MALDEF
and PRLDEF explicitly argued that Latina/os were a "[d]istinct '[r]ace.' 3 45 At the
time that section 1981 was drafted, according to the brief, "the word 'race' was
repeatedly used, not simply to signify groups identifiable by color or physiognomy,
but also to describe the various national or ethnic groupings that were commonly
recognized then and still are recognized today. 3 46 Yet the MALDEF/PRLDEF brief
indicated that the relevant comparisons should be accomplished in a strictly "triethnic" color framework of Latina/os, Blacks, and Whites. 347 To further emphasize
this point, the brief cited the U.S. Supreme Court's "tri-ethnic" equal protection
jurisprudence as demonstrative proof that a significant distinction exists between
discrimination based on race and discrimination based on national origin or
ethnicity. 34 8 While the MALDEF/PRLDEF brief in Al-Khazraji suggested that

343. Id. at 614 (Brennan, J., concurring) (first alteration in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 88 (1973)).
344. Compare Brief of Mexican American Legal Defense & Educational Fund & Puerto Rican Legal Defense
& Education Fund as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Al-Khazraji v. Saint Francis Coll., 481 U.S. 604
(1987) (No. 85-2169), with Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604.
345. Brief of Mexican American Legal Defense & Educational Fund & Puerto Rican Legal Defense &
Education Fund, supra note 344, at 12.
346. Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
347. See id. at 12-14.
348. Id. at 23-25.
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Latina/os had not been racialized as either White or Black, the nation's tri-ethnic
jurisprudence left litigants like MALDEF and the PRLDEF little choice but to argue
Latina/os' national origin and ethnic status in the law.
During the late 1980s and 1990s, "tri-ethnic" discourse and jurisprudence
catalyzed a scarcely noticed de-coupling of the language of ethnicity and race in the
systematic limitation and dismantling of color conscious programs in employment 9
and in government contracting.35 However, just as in the foundational "tri-ethnic"
jurisprudence cases, education emerged as the primary battle ground over the legal
significance ascribed to the operative meaning of race and color in a multihued
United States. In fact, the language of ethnicity disappeared almost completely from
" ' and the
the legal discourse involving, most prominently, the University of Texas35
3
52
University of Michigan. Though the plaintiffs in these cases (Cheryl Hopwood,
Jennifer Gratz, and Barbara Grutter) unabashedly claimed discrimination based on
their own self-identified Whiteness, much as Allan Bakke did, the cases contained
almost none of the White ethnic posturing found in the Bakke litigation.353 Instead,
the appropriate line between the White majority and the non-White minority shaped
much of the legal discussion.354 The analysis accordingly turned not on whether
schools could discriminate against ethnic Whites, but rather on who could be
'
for a narrowly tailored affirmative
of color"355
legitimately counted as a "person
35 6
action admissions program.

349. E.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (plurality opinion).
350. E.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
488 U.S. 469 (1989). The emergence in Croson of a "strict scrutiny" standard to evaluate "racial classifications"
by the state suggested the extent to which courts increasingly understood that race and ethnicity, as legal categories,
were not necessarily one and the same. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94. Justice O'Connor, writing for the plurality
indicated as follows:
Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justifications for such race-basedmeasures, there is
simply no way of determining what classifications are "benign" or "remedial" and what
classifications are infact motivated by illegitimate notions of racialinferiority or simple racial
politics. Indeed, the purpose of strict scrutiny is to "smoke out" illegitimate uses of race by
assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly
suspect tool. The test also ensures that the means chosen "fit" this compelling goal so closely
that there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial
prejudice or stereotype.
Id. at 493 (emphasis added).
Justice Antonin Scalia's concurrence in Croson is particularly revealing: "Racial preferences appear to even
the score'...only if one embraces the proposition that our society is appropriately viewed as divided into races,
making it right that an injustice rendered in the past to a black man should be compensated for by discriminating
against a white." Id. at 528 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis added). While Justice Scalia condemned color
consciousness in such contexts, he curiously indicated an "appropriate" role for color cognition: "[W]here state or
local action is at issue, only a social emergency rising to the level of imminent danger to life and limb" will justify
color cognizance. Id. at 521.
351. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
352. Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002); Grutter v. Bollinger, 188 F.3d 394 (6th Cir. 1999).
353. See supra Part IV.A.
354. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 936 n.4.
355. See, e.g., GEORGE YANCEY: WHO IS WHITE? LATINOS, AsIANS, AND THE NEW BLACK/NONBLACK
DIVIDE 125-47 (2003); Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action for Whom?, 47 STAN. L. REV. 855,
899-900 (1995).
356. The Croson case again illuminates the constitutional mandate for a "narrowly tailored" program. City
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); see also Tom I. Romero, II, The "Tri-Ethnic" Dilemma:
Race, Equality, and the FourteenthAmendment in the American West, 13 TEMPLE POL. & CIv. RTs. L. REV. 817,
854 n.216 (2004) ("Justice O'Connor's majority opinion questioned how narrowly tailored the Richmond City
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In Hopwood, for example, Judge Jerry Smith of the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals derided the University of Texas Law School admissions "classification
scheme" that distinguished between White "minorities" and non-White "nonminorities. ' 357 According to Judge Smith, "While the law school application form
segregated racial and ethnic classification into seven categories-'Black/African
American,' 'Native American,' 'Asian American,' 'Mexican American,' 'Other
Hispanic' (meaning non-Mexican descent), 'White,' and 'Other (describe)'--only
American blacks and Mexican Americans received the benefit of the separate
admissions track.''358 Comparing conceptually Texas's admissions form with the
property and school segregation that had animated post-Brown equal protection
jurisprudence, the court questioned such a narrowly tailored program that "decided
that a black citizen of Nigeria would not get preferential treatment, but a resident
alien from Mexico, who resided in Texas, would. Likewise, Asians, American
Indians, Americans from El Salvador and Cuba, and many others did not receive a
preference. '35 9 Although the plan seemed to be in compliance with the U.S. Supreme
Court's mandate that such a plan be "narrowly tailored" to address a past-history of
discrimination to specific groups, 36° the Hopwood court's derision suggested that
such a scheme would be more legitimate if it classified by White, Black, Indian, and
Hispanic. Indeed, for the court, the differentiation among Hispanic groups was made
even more problematic because Mexican Americans in Texas, unlike Blacks, had
never been subject to de jure discrimination.36 1 Unintentionally highlighting the
precise process of racialization and the corresponding importance of the color line
to U.S. law, the court nevertheless stipulated: "For the sake of simplicity and readability, however, we sometimes will refer to two broad categories: 'whites' (meaning
Texas residents who were considered both White and non-preferred minorities) and
'minorities' (meaning Mexican Americans and [B]lack Americans). 362

Council's minority set-aside government contract program was in view of those 'minority' groups designated as
eligible for such programs."). As I have argued elsewhere, there is something troubling about the static conception
of racial and color discrimination envisioned by the U.S. Supreme Court in relation to a specific history of past
discriminatory treatment, regional difference, and social change. Romero, supra, at 854-56. Although in the
American South the greatest historical racial/color divide has been the one between White and Black, cities like
Richmond are subject to a new color triangulation. The multiracial demographic transformation of the American
South-particularly regarding the rapid rise of its Latino population-suggests a massive redeployment of the color
line. See, e.g., William H. Frey & Reynolds Farley, Latino, Asian, and Black Segregation in U.S. Metropolitan
Areas: Are Multiethnic Metros Different?, 33 DEMOGRAPHY 35, 38-41 (1996) (exploring increasing neighborhood
segregation of Latina/os and Asians in comparison to decreasing Black segregation); Jorge Mariscal, The New "New
South": Latin American Immigrants Are Changing the U.S. Political Landscape, SOJOURNERS MAG., Aug. 2004
(examining the challenge that Latina/o migrants to the South are having on the racial politics of the region).
Nevertheless, under the rationale set forth by the Court in Croson, such change and its impact on those non-Blacks
who are racialized as non-White is not sufficient evidence of discriminatory treatment.
357. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 936 n.4.
358. Id. (emphasis added).
359. Id.
360. Croson, 488 U.S. at 507-08.
361. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 955 n.50. The court further noted as follows: "[T]he law school's argument is even
weaker than that of the university in Podberesky, as there is no dispute that the law school has never had an
admissions policy that excluded Mexican Americans on the basis of race." Id. at 953 (comparing the University of
Texas School of Law admission program to an African American scholarship program at issue in a Fourth Circuit
case decided one year earlier).
362. Id. at 936 n.4. The disappearance of Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders from some selection
programs generated a great deal of anxiety about the meaning of color in the United States. Indeed, the "model
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Moreover, the Hopwood court could not conceptualize the non-White "minority"
status of Mexican Americans. Focusing in particular on the admission goals of the
law school that sought to admit a student body that included a minimum of five
percent Black students and ten percent Mexican American,3 63 Judge Smith bluntly
stated:
There is no history either of dejure discrimination against Mexican Americans
in education at any level in Texas or of defacto discrimination against Mexican
Americans by the law school. Therefore, it is puzzling that the law school would
set an admissions goal for Mexican Americans that is twice that of blacks, as to
whom the history of de jure discrimination in Texas Education in general, and by
the law school in particular, is irrefutable. 3"

Although the late 1960s and early 1970s Texas school "tri-ethnic" school
3 65
desegregation cases put into doubt the "irrefutability" of Judge Smith's assertions,
it is clear that by the mid-1990s he and his brethren did not consider Mexican
Americans to be an "ethnic minority group" comparable either in degree or scope to
the state's "most" discriminated against group, African Americans." Ironically, the
de jure/de facto distinction that was constitutionalized in Keyes came back to deny
Latina/os, at least in Texas, any claim to non-Whiteness that had been made in the
nation's tri-ethnic jurisprudence.
Despite the clear color consciousness displayed in Judge Smith's opinion, he
declared that the goal of the Fourteenth Amendment is "to render the issue of race
irrelevant in governmental decisionmaking. 367 Though Mexican Americans were
ostensibly considered a non-White "race" in Justice Smith's formulation of the law
school's admissions scheme, Mexican Americans were insufficiently "of color,"

minority myth" placed Asian Americans in a liminal and highly problematic space between Whiteness and nonWhiteness in U.S. law and society. See, e.g., Pat K. Chew, Asian Americans: The Reticent Minority and Their
Paradoxes,36 WM. &MARYL. REV. 1, 75-87 (1994) (describing the effect of affirmative action programs on Asian
Americans seeking employment at universities).
363. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 955 n.50.
364. Id. Significantly, the Fifth Circuit's analysis completely rejected the argument made by the Mexican
American Amici that the Mexican American community in Texas had been subject to a long history of racial and
color discrimination in the state-ranging from bias in jury selection to their exclusion from White primaries to the
operation of segregated schools. See Brief of Mexican American Amici Curiae at 4-16, Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d
932 (5th Cir. 1996) (No. 94-50664). Moreover, the "Mexican American Amici," a group that collectively
represented MALDEF, the Mexican American State Employees Association, the Hispanic Bar Association of
Austin, the Mexican American Bar Association of Texas, the Hispanic Pre-Law Student Association, the Chicano
Law Students Association, and the Texas League of United Latin American Citizens, compared such discrimination
throughout in multicolor terms in a matrix that juxtaposed the experiences of Texas's Mexican Americans, Blacks,
and American Indians in relation to those benefits and privileges accorded to the state's White community. Id. at
15-24.
365. See supra notes 89-103 and accompanying text.
366. According to Judge Smith:
If fashioning a remedy for past discrimination is the goal, one would intuit that the minority
group that has experienced the most discrimination would have the lowest college graduation
rate and therefore would be entitled to the most benefit from the designed remedy. The goals
established by the law school are precisely the reverse of that intuitive expectation and are more
reflective of a goal of diversity (which we hold is not compelling) than of a goal of remedying
past discrimination.
Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 955 n.50 (emphasis added).
367. Id. at 940.
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which placed the University of Texas School of Law's affirmative action admissions
program beyond the realm of constitutional protection.
The Fifth Circuit's policing of the White majority and non-White minority in the
admissions policy of the University of Texas highlighted the color stakes in
affirmative action litigation. Significantly, Latina/os, by choosing to identify and be
identified as "people of color," had a "possessive interest" that fundamentally
challenged the "ethnics all" paradigm that seemed to emerge triumphantly in
Bakke.36 8 Yet, a "possessive investment" in color made by Latina/os was in no way
the equivalent of a "possessive investment" in Whiteness.369
The emergence of Whiteness in legal academic discourse was indicative of a major
challenge to the ethnicity paradigm, which was presented by Critical Legal Scholars
(CRITS) and other scholars studying race in the United States. 370 Indeed, a distinct
Latino critical race theory (LatCrit) arose out of this intellectual synergy and claimed
"
a position for Latina/os in discussions of race and the operation of the color line.37
'
Fundamentally rejecting any conception of a post-ethnic or post-racial United
States,372 these commentators challenged others to recognize not only the
entrenchment of "Whiteness as property" but to reconcile the operation of color
against a wide-variety of inconsistently racialized non-White groups.
Perhaps it was fitting that the University of Michigan, whose administration
openly and proudly endorsed programs designed to bring more people of color into
the academy while at the same time failing to appreciate its own historic
marginalization of a Native community, ended up being the legal battleground to
determine this issue. While Jennifer Gratz and Barbara Grutter filed separate class
action lawsuits against the University of Michigan Literature Science and Arts
Program (LSA) and the Law School in 1997 for ostensibly denying them admission
based on their White identity,373 in the year 2000 the Students of Color Coalition-

368. See supra Part W.A.
369. George Lipsitz, The PossessiveInvestment in Whiteness: RacializedSocial Democracy and the "White"
Problem in American Studies, 47 AM. Q. 369 (1995). In his groundbreaking article, Professor George Lipsitz first
developed the terminology to understand the continued maintenance of a highly unequal and oppressive color line
in the United States. Id. In addition to Lipsitz, other scholars have carefully explored this "investment." See supra
note 26. 1 have explored an emerging, but by no means equivalent, "possessive investment" in color made by
Latina/os made in context of the War on Poverty. See Romero, supra note 48. As Professor Cheryl Harris argued
in her influential essay, Whiteness as Property,non-Whites' "possessive investment" in color conscious programs
such as affirmative action are fundamentally different:
Acknowledging [non-White] identity does not involve the systematic subordination of whites,
nor does it even set up a danger of doing so. Affirmative action is based on the principles of
antisubordination, not principles of Black superiority.
The removal of white privilege pursuant to a program of affirmative action would not be
implemented under an ideology of subordination, nor would it be situated in the context of
historical or present exploitation of whites.
Harris, supra note 1,at 1785 (footnote omitted).
370. This body of literature is long and extensive. For an overview of the intellectual development of Critical
Legal Studies, see CRrrICAL RACE THEORY (Kimberl6 Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995).
371. This body of literature is also long and extensive, as is evidenced by the fact that it has been the subject
of eleven symposiums since 1995. For an overview of the LatCrit movement as well as the extent of this literature,
see Francisco Valdes, Poised at the Cusp: LatCrit Theory, OutsiderJurisprudenceandLatina/o Self-Empowerment,
2 HARv. LATtNo L. REv. 1 (1997).
372. See supra Part 1I.B.
373. According to Justice O'Connor, the University of Michigan Law School admissions program was based
on a commitment "to racial and ethnic diversity with special reference to the inclusion of students from groups
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comprised largely of the University's Latino and American Indian communitiesconfronted the University about its tacit support of a "secret society" known as
"Michigamua," the name of which was derived from a supposedly extinct band of
Michigan American Indians.374 In existence for nearly a hundred years and including
such distinguished alumni as Fielding Yost, ex-President Gerald Ford, and late U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Frank Murphy, the Michigamua "wigwam" was housed by the
University in the tower of the Michigan Student Union.3 75 For most of its history,
members of Michigamua had engaged in a long and racialized "playing Indian"
discourse;3 76 its membership employed demeaning and stereotypical rituals, language,
and attire as part of their initiation ceremonies and regular society activities.377
According to one account, such "exclusionist, racist and detrimental.. .rituals were
reminiscent of the black-face minstrel shows from the 1950s. ' ' 37 Although members
of Michigamua had signed a contract with American Indian students and groups to
stop all such practices in 1989, vestiges of its troublesome past remained vivid
enough to call into question the meaning of and commitment to diversity of a
multiracial school and a multiracial United States. 37 9 Expectedly, while students of
color banded together to support the University of Michigan's attempt to dismantle
White privilege, they also came together to confront the University about its own
implicit support of an organization that worked to racialize and ultimately demean the
culture, history, and values of its American Indian students.
Thus, by the time that Grutterand Gratz made it to the docket of the U.S. Supreme
Court in 2002, the color line had definitively been drawn. However, even those in the
best position to challenge the privileges of Whiteness drew the line in inconsistent
and often contradictory ways. For Latina/o litigants the case once again provided an
opportunity to proclaim their own distinct non-Whiteness. The joint amici brief of the
Hispanic National Bar Association and the Hispanic Association of Colleges and
Universities emphasized the following:
The generation contemplating law school or higher education today has enjoyed
freedom from slavery and involuntary servitude, but the process of equalization

which have been historically discriminated against, like African-Americans, Hispanics, and Native-Americans, who
without this commitment might not be represented in [the] student body in meaningful numbers." Grutter v.

Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 316 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).
374.
14, 2000.
375.
376.
Americans
377.

Tiffany Maggart & Robert Gold, Student Coalition Leaves Union After 37 Day Stay, MICH. DAILY, Mar.
UM Students End 37-Day Sit-in at Secret Society's Office, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 13, 2000.
See generally PHILIP J. DELORIA, PLAYING INDIAN (1998) (detailing the various ways in which White
have utilized American Indian imagery and iconography to meet their own political or social ends).
Sarah Lewis, Prof.Explores Native American Portrayals,MICH. DAILY, Jan. 27, 1999.

378. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
379. One report noted this inconsistency:
Groups of faculty and staff have signed statements of support for the SCC. But U.M. President
Lee Bollinger has met only once and inconclusively with the protesters, made misleading
statements, reduced the issue to one of "space allocation," and offered no concessions. Recently
he said he never would have supported the 1989 agreement if he had been on campus at the time,
pointing to the society's First Amendment rights. He has called the SCC action unreasonable yet
he yielded in 24 hours to an all-white group that had occupied another building to demand U.M.
cease purchasing from sweatshop manufacturers.
Elizabeth Martinez, Students of Color Fight Racism at Univ. of Mich. with Month-Long Occupation,ZNET DAILY
COMMENTARIES, Mar. 8, 2000, http://www.zmag.org/sustainers/content/2000-03/08martinez.htm.
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contemplated by the Fourteenth Amendment continues. Disparities between
whites and non-whites are found at virtually every level of society....
It is of particular importance for the Hispanic community to have multilingual
representation."'

Similarly, the brief of the "Latino Organizations" argued that "[tihe Latino
community-identified consistently from its forcible introduction to this nation as
significantly distinct from the white majority-is one community whose members'
experiences are profoundly influenced by race or ethnicity." 3 8' The brief highlighted
the fact that
[t]he nation's two largest Latino subgroups [Puerto Ricans and Mexican
Americans] share an experience that only two other racial minority groups
claim-namely the forcible and involuntary introduction of the group to United
States residency. While the ranks of those forcibly introduced have been swelled
by numerous subsequent immigrants, these newcomers join communities long
viewed as non-white and subjected to discrimination on the basis of their
difference. 2

Remarkably, in the U.S. Supreme Court's first extended discussions about the
meaning of diversity since Bakke, neither in Gratz nor Grutter did the majority
opinion attempt to address the meaning of ethnicity, race, or color. Though a color
line in each case was drawn between African American, Latina/o, Native American,
and White students, that line had significance only in relation to enrolling a "'critical
mass' of "'minority [non-White] students.' 383 This was a "race-conscious" line, as
Justice O'Connor pointed out, on which "[p]ublic and private universities across the
Nation [had] modeled their own admissions programs" in the twenty-five years since
the Bakke decision. 384 Despite claiming that race continued to play a significant role
in the operation of equality and justice in the United States,3 85 the Court-like the
Court in Bakke twenty-five years earlier-rendered this observation meaningless by
indicating that a"broad range of qualities.. .may be considered valuable38 6contributions
to [achieve the compelling state interest of] student body diversity.,

380. Brief Amici Curiae of the Hispanic National Bar Ass'n & the Hispanic Ass'n of Colleges & Universities
in Support of Respondents at 11, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241) (citation omitted).
381. Brief of Latino Organizations as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 5, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241).
382. Id. at 6 (footnote omitted).
383. Grutter,539 U.S. at 329 (quoting Brief for Respondents at 13, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)
(No. 02-241)).
384. Id. at 323.
385. Id. at 333.
386. Id. at 338. According to Justice O'Connor:
[T]he 1992 policy.. .provides examples of admittees who have lived or traveled widely abroad,
are fluent in several languages, have overcome personal adversity and family hardship, have
exceptional records of extensive community service, and have had successful careers in other
fields....
What is more, the Law School actually gives substantial weight to diversity factors besides
race. The Law School frequently accepts nonminority applicants with grades and test scores
lower than underrepresented minority applicants (and other nonminority applicants) who are
rejected. This shows that the Law School seriously weighs many other diversity factors besides
race that can make a real and dispositive difference for nonminority applicants as well. By this
flexible approach, the Law School sufficiently takes into account, in practice as well as in theory,
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In her dissent in Gratz, Justice Ginsburg questioned whether "[t]he stain of
generations of racial oppression [that was] still visible in our society" could be so
easily considered one and the same with other traits and characteristics. 38 7 Particularly
for Latina/os, African Americans, and American Indians who "historically have been
relegated to inferior status by law and social practice" and whose "members continue
to experience class-based discrimination to this day, 388 Justice Ginsburg questioned
an admissions system that
may encourage applicants to write of their cultural traditions in the essays they
submit, or to indicate whether English is their second language. Seeking to
improve their chances for admission, applicants may highlight the minority group
associations to389which they belong, or the Hispanic surnames of their mothers or
grandparents.

By refusing to diminish the debilitating consequence of "race" or the empty gestures
of ethnicity in the subsequent enforcement of a "caste"/color distinction, Justice
Ginsburg's dissent made evident the fundamental failure of the nation's "tri-ethnic"
jurisprudence.
V. CONCLUSION: BEYOND A TRI-ETHNIC JURISPRUDENCE
When the U.S. Supreme Court, in Keyes v. School DistrictNumber One, assessed
for the first time the role that Latina/os would play in school desegregation and
equal protection litigation, it intimated that the color line of the American South
would prove incompatible with national transformations in the country's racial
order. Although the decision unambiguously indicated for many a more nuanced and
sophisticated understanding of race and color, the Court's use of the terms "biracial" and "tri-ethnic" to describe Denver's social complexity contributed to a
fractured and inconsistent understanding of Latina/os racial position in U.S. culture
and life.
While Keyes promised to supersede the Black/White color line in American
constitutional jurisprudence by replacing its "bi-racial" lens with a "tri-ethnic" one,
it ironically contributed to a new in-betweeness for Latina/os in the law. Within one
year, the nation's courts began the process of reformulating the line between race
and ethnicity with the emergence of bilingual education and the national origin
classification in the nation's equality of educational opportunity jurisprudence.
Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court signaled in Lau the nation's legal priorities when
ethnic traits such as language were pitted against the condition of race, rather than
as an interrelated component in the process of racialization and the subsequent
construction and maintenance of the color line.
As a result, by the 1980s, various courts set up a fallacious dichotomy between
permissible ethnic differentiation and impermissible racial discrimination. The

a wide variety of characteristics besides race and ethnicity that contribute to a diverse student
body.
Id. at 338-39 (citation omitted).
387. Gratz v. Bolinger, 539 U.S. 244, 304 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
388. Id. at 303.
389. Id. at 304 (emphasis added).
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question, as it emerged in the language discrimination cases in the 1980s, was not
whether Latina/os were "other White" or "other Black," but rather whether they
constituted an ethnic or a racial group subject to a lower standard of legal protection
when the discrimination was ostensibly based on "bona fide" ethnic considerations.
Finally, Bakke's challenge to the use of affirmative action to dismantle White
privilege only served to further reinforce the repositioning of Latina/os squarely on
the non-White side of the color divide. Justice Powell's plurality opinion, however,
seemingly rendered this distinction meaningless by treating as nearly identical
individual discrimination, systemic discrimination, and other skills associated with
the recruiting of a diverse student body. Yet, by preserving the prerogative of
institutions of higher education to use one's non-White minority status as one of
many factors in their admissions decisions, it signified the continued importance of
the content and meaning of the color line in achieving social justice and equality in
the United States.
By the time that Grutterand Gratz made their way to the U.S. Supreme Court,
it was not so obvious that race served any conceptual value in the legal
determination. Because racial and ethnic terminology had become so disjointed, it
was nearly impossible to evaluate Justice O'Connor's observation that "race
unfortunately still matter[ed]" in the United States.39 ° Indeed, what was the
significance of African American, Latina/o, and Native American students being
classified together in order to increase "diversity" at the University of Michigan Law
School? What if the diversity program only targeted Latina/os? Did it matter to the
Court that in the year prior to its decision the "law school had an entering class with
a total minority population of about 25 percent, but with no Mexican-Americans
391
among its 6.8 percent Hispanics and 6 percent African Americans"?

By ultimately recognizing the University of Michigan's "compelling state
interest" to achieve "diversity" by recruiting Latina/os-as students of colorGrutterreinforced Keyes' basic understanding of Latina/os as a non-White group.
As in other "tri-ethnic" cases, however, this was at best an incomplete victory.392
While Keyes and Grutter established that Latina/os could be racially classified as
non-White to establish the segregated character of a school as a permissible effort
to increase diversity, or to dismantle a past pattern and practice of discrimination,
the nation's tri-ethnic jurisprudence, as a whole, made it abundantly clear that
390. Grutter,539 U.S. at 333.
391. Kevin R. Johnson, The Last Twenty Five Years of Affirmative Action?, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 171, 178
(2004).
392. As Professor Juan Perea has argued, the Grutterdecision was designed to "legitimize, in the eyes of all,
educational and professional processes that yield, at the national level, remarkably little diversity and remarkably
unequal results." Juan Perea, Buscando Amdrica: Why Integrationand Equal Protection Fail to Protect Latinos,
117 HARv. L. REv. 1420, 1453 (2004). Professor Perea strongly noted that the Court in Grutterchose to emphasize
the value of diversity in terms of benefiting those on the White side of the color line. Id. at 1452-53.

According to Justice O'Connor,
These benefits are not theoretical but real, as major American businesses have made clear that
the skills needed in today's increasingly global marketplace can only be developed through
exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints. What is more, high-ranking

retired officers and civilian leaders of the United States military assert that, [biased on (their]
decades of experience, a highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps.. .is essential to the
military's ability to fulfill its principle mission to provide national security.
Grutter,539 U.S. at 330-31 (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Latina/os, on their own, remained an in-between group. The parameters of this
interstitial position are thus defined not only by conceptions of Blackness and
Whiteness but also by jurisprudential and social confusion arising between the use
and definition of race and ethnicity. Without the ability to bring meaningful clarity
to the use and deployment of such terms in the nation's jurisprudence, Justice
O'Connor's hope that "the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary" by
2028 remains nothing more than an empty aspirational goal for most Latina/os as
well as other inconsistently racialized non-Whites.393
Only three years after Grutter and Gratz seemed to settle the continued use of
racial "preferences" in education for the next quarter century,394 the U.S. Supreme
Court granted certiorari in a collection of affirmative action public school
desegregation cases involving school districts in Seattle, Washington and Louisville,
Kentucky.395 Ironically, these cases "could put the court on the opposite side of an
old issue. Having once told school officials that the Constitution says they must
desegregate their classrooms, the court will now consider whether the Constitution
forbids official efforts to maintain integration. 396 As one commentator noted, the
Court's decision "could signal a historical shift on the role of race in education,"
putting into doubt not only the Court's decision in Grutter,but also the continued
viability of Brown and its related jurisprudence.397
For these very reasons, these cases represent an opportunity that is similar in
many respects to the one confronted by the nation's courts as a result of the
Latina/os that challenged public school segregation in the late 1960s and early
1970s.3 98 The U.S. Supreme Court will have the opportunity to critically examine
the use, deployment, and historical meanings of racial categories in a multicolored
United States. The opinions of the lower courts in each case demonstrated the
linguistic netherworld to which Latina/os and other non-White and non-Black
groups have been assigned in understanding racial classification schemes. In Judge
O'Scannlain's Ninth Circuit opinion, for instance, the court highlighted the
geographic concentration of Seattle's student population, noting specifically that
Asian, Black, Hispanic, and American Indian students are non-White. 399 Chief Judge
Heyburn's Western District of Kentucky memorandum opinion, on the other hand,
explained a Louisville, Kentucky school district's practice of identifying "the race

393. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343.
394. See Vikram David Amar & Evan Caminker, Constitutional Sunsetting?: Justice O'Connor'sClosing
Comments in Grutter, 30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 541, 542 (2003).
395. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (2006).
396. David G. Savage, Court to HearChallenge to Race-Based School, L.A. TMES, June 6, 2006.
397. Id.
398. See supra Part H1.
399. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 377 F.3d 949, 955 n.4 (9th Cir. 2004).
Seattle's student population is approximately 40 percent white and 60 percent non-white.
Splitting Seattle along a north-south axis, data introduced by the School District indicates that
74.2 percent of the District's Asian students, 83.6 percent of its black students, 65.0 percent of
its Hispanic students, and 51.1 percent of its Native American students live in the southern half
of the city. By contrast, 66.8 percent of the District's white student population lives in the
northern half of the city. Overall, approximately 77.2 percent of students in the southern half of
the city, and just 35.7 percent of students in the northern half of the city, are non-white.
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of each student as Black or African-American and Other."'
Heybum:

According to Judge

This particular practice of distinguishing only Black and non-Black students and
referencing non-Black students as "Others" was discussed rather extensively
during the hearing .... [because the contested school district] is a school district
almost entirely populated by only Black and White students. Students of other
races and backgrounds, such as Latino and Asian students, are represented only
in very small numbers, e.g., less than five percent of the total student population
is neither non-Hispanic Black nor White.4"'
Indicating that the racialization of Latina/os and Asians could only be recognized
if students from each group were represented in larger numbers, Chief Judge
Heybum placed this small number of students on the "other-White" side of the color
divide. 2
While it may be true that many school districts remain split along dichotomous
lines like the one found in Louisville, Kentucky, such districts are becoming
noticeably the exception and not the rule. °3 Even in those districts where
segregation is unquestionably bi-racial, the increasingly more salient color line is the
one between Whites and Latina/os.40° Yet, because the nation's jurisprudence on
racial and ethnic categorization has become so far removed from questions of
history and power, courts have lost the ability to evaluate the operation of systemic
inequities in a diverse U.S. culture. As Gary Orfield and Chungmei Lee have noted:
If segregation were just about race or ethnicity, it might be only of academic
interest. However, segregation is rarely only by race or ethnicity. It is almost
always double or triple segregation, involving concentrated poverty and,
increasingly, linguistic segregation, and this multiple segregation is almost
always related to many forms of tangible inequality in educational opportunity
on multiple dimensions." 5
Simply put, the nation's equality jurisprudence, resting on a "tri-ethnic" foundation
in which race, ethnicity, and color distinctions are used interchangeably, is ill-suited
for meaningful discussions of, much less providing cognizable legal remedies for,
such modem segregation in the contemporary United States.
Thus, remarkably similar to my Grandparents' generation, Latina/os in the
twenty-first century continue to bear the burden of double or triple segregation by
receiving lower wages, working more difficult jobs, and living in less desirable

400. McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 350 F. Supp. 2d 834, 840 n.6 (W.D. Ky. 2004).
401. Id.
402. See id.
403. As Gary Orfield and Chungmei Lee have documented, "since the 1990s, the percentage of students of
every race in multiracial groups has increased. Segregation is no longer black and white but increasingly
multiracial." Press Release, The Civil Rights Project of Harvard Univ., Racial Transformation and the Changing
Nature of Segregation (Jan. 15, 2006), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/news/pressreleases/
deseg06.php.
404. CHUNGMEi LEE, DENVER PUBUC SCHOOLS: RESEGREGATION, LATINO STYLE (2006), available at
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/deseg/Denver-Reseg.pdf"
405. GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, RACIAL TRANSFORMATION AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF
SEGREGATION 4 (2006) (emphasis added), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/deseg/
RacialTransformation.pdf.
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neighborhoods than other groups in U.S. society. In a pattern established long ago,
political opportunism contributes to the continued racialization of Latina/os as nonWhite as a result of citizenship and language differences.4 6 Such realities have
fallen heaviest on the institution conceived of as best able to propel individuals up
the social ladder. Latina/o students are disproportionately represented among
students in poorer, substandard, and segregated school districts;"7 face substantial
differences in language skill and social discrimination; 4 s and, as a result, are more
4 9
likely than their White and African American peers to drop out of primary school
4
0
and are less likely to matriculate in institutions of higher education. As long as
courts continue to be mired in the premises of "ti-ethnic" jurisprudence, Justice
O'Connor's observation in Grutterthat "race unfortunately still matters" will remain
an immeasurable fact. To be sure, without the resolve to arrive at a more nuanced
and sophisticated understanding of race, ethnicity, and, most importantly, color in
our equality jurisprudence, Latina/o students will face the same sense of racial
confusion and color dislocation that I, along with my family, have experienced. In
the end, this might be the most defining feature of a Latino race in modern law.

406. The sharpened and coordinated emergence of immigration reform in the United States in recent years
is one example. See, e.g., Tyler Atkins, Note, Immigration Consequences of Guilty Pleas: What State v. Paredez
Means to New Mexico Criminal Defendants and Defense Attorneys, 36 N.M. L. REV. 603, 604-05 (2006)
(discussing recent changes in federal immigration law that have proven to be extremely detrimental to non-U.S.
citizens); Nina Bernstein, On Lucille Avenue, the Immigration Debate, N.Y. TIMES, June 26,2006, at Al (exploring
the local impact on national policy debates concerning undocumented immigration); Rachel L. Swarns, Critics Say
Politics Is Driving Hearings on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2006, at A10 (examining the political
ramifications of immigration hearings in the Fall 2006 elections). A related issue is the reemergence of "Englishonly" measures and "official English" policy and litigation in the United States. See, e.g., Kenya Hart, Defending
Against a "Death by English": English-Only, Spanish-Only, and a Gringa's Suggestions for Community Support
of Language Rights, 14 BERKELEY LA RAzA L.J. 177 (2003); David Michael Miller, Note, Assimilate Me. It's as
Easy as (Getting Rid ofi Uno, Dos, Tres, 74 UMKC L. REV. 455 (2005); Austan Goolsbee, Legislate Learning
English? If Only It Were So Easy, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2006, at C32 (highlighting the pedagogical challenges and
political implications of English-only learning).
407. Kevin R. Johnson & George A. Martinez, Discrimination by Proxy: The Case of Proposition 227 and
the Ban on Bilingual Education, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1227, 1241 (2000).
408. Id.; Ren6 Galindo & Jami Vigil, Language Restrictionism Revisited: The Case Against Colorado's 2000
Anti-Bilingual Education Initiative, 7 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 27 (2004).
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